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The Necessity, Public Interest, and Proportionality in 
International Investment Law: A Comparative Analysis 
Abdulkadir GÜLÇÜR 
Abstract 
This article deals with relations of the three concepts of interna-
tional investment law which can be enumerated as “necessity,” 
“public interest,” and “proportionality.” These three concepts have 
been reviewed in the light of the relevant investment tribunals’ deci-
sions and judgments of other international judicial bodies. In demo-
cratic governments, legal acts and actions must be based on the 
“public interest.” However, the “public interest” does not constitute 
by itself a determinative factor for lawfulness. The proportionality 
principle has a significant role in the investment arbitrations con-
cerning whether the “public interest” aim is met. Albeit those infer-
ences, the “public interest” claim is not a magic key which opens all 
doors. Because even if such a claim is asserted, it will be insufficient 
when some governmental actions are pursued to protect vital inter-
ests of the State. Hence, “state of necessity” always has been re-
tained on the agenda of international law. Therefore, the customary 
law had developed stringent requirements for meeting the conditions 
of “necessity.” 
Introduction 
In modern international investment law, one of the major issues 
is related to government actions, which can be regarded as tanta-
mount to the expropriation of foreign investments. There is no doubt 
that regulatory measures of the governments have specific value 
whether such measures, for instance, are undertaken for protection of 
public interests or the environment; and therefore, can be considered 
as an expropriation that is economically justified.1 Economic analysis 
Research Assistant and Ph.D. Candidate at Marmara University Faculty of Law, Interna-
tional Law Department. LL.B. (2013), Istanbul University Faculty of Law, LL.M. 
(2017), Marmara University Institute of Social Sciences. I would like to thank eminent 
scholar Dean Emeritus Professor Frank (Tom) Read (from South Texas College of 
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of international law can be a useful tool for that determination. Be-
sides, in necessity cases, economic analysis of law also is a decisive 
factor concerning whether government fiscal policies have a negative 
impact on economic exigency. In a series of Argentine cases, “Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes” (ICSID) tri-
bunals reviewed that matter. Except for the LG&E v. Argentine Tri-
bunal2, all of them accepted the contribution of government policies 
to the financial crisis. 
This article will show the boundaries of “necessity” and “public 
interest” in order to demonstrate how the proportionality principle 
would carry out its function in the disputes. There are several consid-
erations and distinct theories capable of influencing the consequenc-
es. For this reason, it is quite important to examine the large number 
sources which are included both in the jurisprudence, set by cases of 
investment arbitration as well as the studies of eminent scholars. 
Therefore, relevant decisions of ICSID tribunals and other interna-
tional judicial bodies have been reviewed in the article. Furthermore, 
particular attention has been paid to the inclusion of opposite views 
in the doctrine and therefore, has been adhered to the dialectic pro-
cess. 
In Part 1, from the first modern arbitration practice in the so-
called Neptune case to the Argentine cases which were brought to the 
ICSID tribunals by American investors, the “necessity” defense of 
States has been reviewed. Part 2 aims to reveal the intellectual back-
ground of “economic analysis of law.” That analysis provides con-
tractual solutions to the disputes. The Russian Indemnity case is a his-
torical and appropriate example of this approach. In terms of 
investment law, determination of the investment definition usually 
has been reviewed and criticized by the arbitral tribunals and schol-
ars. One of the requirements of the investment definition, which was 
developed by Salini Tribunal, is problematic. According to that re-
Law) for his helpful comments on this article. I feel privileged to have participated in 
Professor Read’s various courses about American law and tort law at Bahcesehir Uni-
versity from 2011 to 2017. His critiques have provided an inestimable contribution to 
the article. I am also grateful to my mother, father, and brother for their valuable sup-
port and encouragement. All errors are solely my own. E-mails: akgulcur@gmail.com 
and abdulkadir.gulcur@marmara.edu.tr 1. MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 363-364 (2013). 
 2. See, infra note 20.
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quirement, a foreign investment must provide a “contribution to host 
State’s economic development.” That attitude also has a direct rela-
tionship with “economic analysis of law.” 
Part 3 examines the “public interest” concept and its improve-
ment in modern investment arbitration. Third-party submissions and 
public participation to the cases have a possible impact on dispute 
settlements. “Public interest” defenses of States are also observable 
from cases concerning indirect expropriations related to regulatory 
measures. For a deeper understanding of the balance between “public 
interest” of States and legitimate expectations & rights of foreign in-
vestors, I allocated Part 4 for the principle of proportionality. The 
proportionality principle shows up as different sources of internation-
al law under the “Article 38/1 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ),” as a “treaty provision” or as a “customary interna-
tional law” rule or as a “general principle of law” depending on the 
sub-branches of international law. In the sense of international in-
vestment law, proportionality principle is acceptable as a “general 
principle of law” unless there is an existence of a provision in the rel-
evant treaty, mostly in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
1. The Necessity Defense in International Investment Law
1.1. The Neptune Case
Necessity is one of the oldest defenses of States which have done
a wrongful act under international law. The oldest dispute in the 
modern arbitration practice regarding the “state of necessity” is the 
Neptune case which was taken to the judicial body constituted under 
the “Jay Treaty.” The “Jay Treaty” is a “Treaty of Amity, Commerce 
and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States” signed 
on November 19, 1794.3 The Jay Treaty set up three mixed commis-
sions under articles 5, 6, and 7. Article 7 relates to the complaints of 
American citizens who had suffered losses because of the illegal cap-
ture of their vessels during the maritime war between France and 
Great Britain.4 The case of Neptune concerning seized vessels under 
an order of April 1795 issued by the British government. The order 
had instructions to the commanders of warships “to stop and detain 
 3. Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Jay Treaty (1794), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (VOL. 1), 108 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981).
 4. Id. at 109.
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all vessels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour or meal bound for 
any port in France.”5  One of the seized vessels was Neptune which 
was partly loaded with rice and had departed from Charleston to 
reach to the port of Bordeaux. The vessel was brought to London, and 
its cargo was sold to the British government under the supervision of 
the high court of admiralty.6 
The claimant demanded his possible profit if the cargo would 
have reached Bordeaux. But the registrar and merchants acted under 
the rule of order prescribed by the British government and allowed 
only the invoice price together with a mercantile profit of 10 percent. 
Thereupon the claimant applied to the board of commissioners under 
“Article VII of the Jay Treaty” for compensation of his loss. The 
British government defended itself claiming that, the capture was 
lawful and must be considered as contraband of war. The board of 
commissioners, by a majority vote, rejected the argument of the Brit-
ish government and accepted the compensation which was demanded 
by the claimant.7 
Commissioner Gore indicated that there is no “state of necessity” 
for Great Britain, as defined by Grotius, which would justify the sei-
zure of victuals belonging to neutrals.8 Another commissioner, Mr. 
Pinkney, also defended that Grotius considered the right of seizure as 
the indispensable means of self-defense, not as a means of reduction 
of the enemy.9 He added a quotation from Grotius and defined “ne-
cessity” as a real and pressing condition not imaginary. But the 
statements of the agent of Britain’s to the commission could not justi-
fy the requirements of necessity occurring in the facts of the dis-
pute.10 Lastly, fifth commissioner Mr. Trumbull elaborated the issue 
differently and specified that if the ship seized in the act of entering 
or attempting to access a port where besieged or blockaded and 
known by the neutral master, the capture would be considered as le-
gal and regular under the law of nations.11 Like two other commis-
 5. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY,
VOL. 4, 3843 (1898).
 6. Id.
 7. Id. at 3844.
 8. Id. at 3853.
 9. Id. at 3859.
 10. Id. at 3873.
 11. Id. at 3878.
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sioners, Mr. Trumbull thought that “necessity must be absolute and 
irresistible and until all other means of self-preservation shall have 
been exhausted,” the seizure of goods “can be justified by the plea of 
necessity.” Therefore, he concluded that “the claimant suffered loss 
and damage by irregular and illegal capture.”12 
State practice and judicial decisions demonstrate that the necessi-
ty defense only precludes wrongfulness under strict requirements.13 
According to Article 25 of the “ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States,”14 the necessity defense is only acceptable under the two 
conjunct conditions. To satisfy the “necessity requirements,” the 
State’s actions must be the “only way for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” and “should not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community.” 
1.2. Argentine Cases before the ICSID Tribunals and Commit-
tees 
Under the ICSID system, some tribunals or committees have al-
lowed the broader “necessity defense,” while others approached it 
narrowly and did not accept the “state of necessity.”  Many invest-
ment arbitrations reveal this paradox. In the CMS Gas v. Argentine 
dispute, the Tribunal indicated that the, “Argentine crisis was severe 
but did not result in total economic and social collapse.”15 In addition, 
the Tribunal determined that Argentine’s “government policies and 
their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis.”16 Thus, the 
Thus, the Tribunal concluded that the cumulative requirements of the 
necessity under customary international law were not satisfied.17 
However, during the annulment proceedings of this “Award of the 
Tribunal,” the ad hoc Committee found some errors of law. Accord-
ing to the Committee, “Article XI of the Argentine-United States 
 12. Id. at 3884-3885.
 13. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. 2, Part 2, ¶ 14 at 83.
 14. International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as ILC Draft 2001).
 15. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 355 at 102. For examination to relevant paragraphs of Award see
also, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 101-110 at 26-29.
 16. CMS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 329 at 95. See, paragraph 2(b) of Article 25 of the “ILC
Draft 2001”.
 17. CMS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 331 at 96.
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BIT”18 and “Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001” are substantially dif-
ferent. “Article XI of the BIT” regulates the measures necessary for 
maintaining “public order” or the protection of “essential interests” of 
the parties.  Whereas “Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001” governs the 
cumulative condition of the “state of necessity.”  Thus, the Commit-
tee held that these texts had different requirements and found that the 
Tribunal made an “error of law” when it did not analyze them sepa-
rately.  However, the Committee acknowledged that annulment 
committees had very limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of ICSID 
Convention, and accepted that it could not apply its own view to the 
dispute.19 
The LG&E v. Argentine Tribunal made different conclusions 
than the CMS Gas v. Argentine Tribunal. In LG&E, the Tribunal de-
termined that the claimants could not prove that Argentine caused the 
crisis and that the Argentine Government’s attitude exhibited a desire 
to slow down the crisis “by all the means available.”20 So that, inter 
alia other reasons the Tribunal considered that conditions for invok-
ing the “state of necessity” were met.21 Thus, the Tribunal decided 
that, because of article XI of the BIT, Argentine was exempt from in-
ternational responsibility as a result of any breaches of the BIT be-
tween December 2001 and April 2003.22 The annulment proceedings 
of LG&E ceased by virtue of the claimants’ request for the discontin-
uance of the proceeding under Rule 44 of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules.23 Because of that, we never learned how the annulment com-
mittee would react to the Tribunal’s Award. 
 18. “Article XI of the Argentine-United States BIT” reads as follows:
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its 
own essential security interests.” 
 19. The decision of the CMS Committee, supra note 15, ¶¶ 128-136 at 34-36.
 20. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 256 at 77.
 21. Id., ¶ 259 at 78.
 22. Id., ¶ 229 at 68.
 23. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Order of the Secretary-General Taking
Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ¶¶ 4-7.
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The LG&E v. Argentine decision was criticized by some au-
thors24 because the text of Article XI does not expressly exempt the 
host State from the international responsibility.  Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal imported “Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001,” and despite Arti-
cle 27 (b) regarding compensation for any material loss caused by a 
wrongful act, it exempted the respondent State from responsibility for 
a term involving the economic crisis.  Consequently, the level of 
damages assessed by the LG&E Tribunal was so low relative to the 
compensation decisions of other relevant judicial bodies.25 
In the Enron v. Argentine dispute, the Tribunal pointed out that 
the “state of necessity” condition is very extreme, and it has strict re-
quirements..  Therefore, notwithstanding the severe crisis, the Tribu-
nal was not convinced that it was affecting the State’s essential inter-
ests.26  This case also involved another debate about “Article 27 (b) of 
ILC Draft 2001.”  The claimants argued that article 27 (b) ensures 
compensation for any material loss derived from the measures which 
are undertaken,27 while the respondent argued that 27 (b) entails 
compensation for adopted measures after the “state of necessity” is 
over.  The Tribunal acknowledged that this article does not leave out 
the probability of an ultimate compensation for past incidents.28 
Annulment proceedings in Enron v. Argentine are quite impres-
sive because of the different approach to “state of necessity” under 
“customary international law” which was reflected in “Article 25 of 
 24. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State
Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (2012); Jose E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi,
The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Invest-
ment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-
2009, at 457-458 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009) (indicating that several international tri-
bunals have affirmed that the “state of necessity” would not preclude payment of com-
pensation under the customary law. The authors cited the ICJ Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
decision which pointed out that “state of necessity” does not excuse a State from its
obligation to compensate its partner in any situation. However, they also expressed
that the LG&E Tribunal did not address the question of compensation under the cus-
tomary law requirements of the “state of necessity.” See, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Pro-
ject (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, ¶ 49 at 39)).
 25. Alec Stone Sweet, Giacinto Della Cananea, Proportionality, General Principles of
Law, and Investor-State Arbitration: A Response to Jose Alvarez, 46 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L.
& POL. 929 (2014).
 26. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 304-313 at 97-99.
 27. Id. ¶ 302 at 96.
 28. Id. ¶ 345 at 108.
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ILC Draft 2001.”  As Alvarez emphasizes, this decision endorses 
broadening the traditional defense of “state of necessity” under “cus-
tomary international law.”29 In this case, ad hoc Annulment Commit-
tee criticized several aspects of the Enron Award.  The criticisms fo-
cused inter alia on two main areas.  According to the Committee, the 
Tribunal relied upon expert opinion instead of implementing the cus-
tomary international law rule reflected in “Article 25(1)(a) of ILC 
Draft 2001.”  Also, the Tribunal failed to explain why the “only way” 
requirement under Article 25(1)(a) was not satisfied.  This triggered 
the “annulment decision under Article 52(1)(b) and (e) of the ICSID 
Convention.”30 
The Enron Annulment Committee’s decision could be seen as an 
exceptional interpretation compared to other annulment committees’ 
decisions.  Indeed, the CMS Annulment Committee concluded that 
“whatever may have been the errors made in this respect by the Tri-
bunal, there is no manifest excess of powers or lack of reasoning on 
the part of the Award concerning the Article XI of the BIT and the 
state of necessity under customary international law.”31  Thus, the 
CMS Committee only upheld the annulment request concerning the 
umbrella clause and dismissed other claims.32  Despite accepting the 
broader necessity defense under customary law, The Enron Commit-
tee, like the CMS Committee, noted that “Article 25 of ILC Draft 
2001” and “Article XI of the BIT,” are not the same because they 
have different operations and content.  As a result, the Enron Com-
mittee annulled the Tribunal’s Award regarding the inapplicability of 
“Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001” and “Article XI of the BIT” separate-
ly.33 
The Sempra v. Argentine Tribunal had the opportunity to exam-
ine other Awards because it was decided later than other cases filed 
against Argentine.  The Sempra Tribunal indicated that the LG&E 
conclusions were different from the CMS and Enron Awards.  From 
 29. José E. Alvarez, State Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the Fu-
ture, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2012).
 30. The Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 377-378 at 154.
 31. CMS Annulment Committee, supra note 15, ¶ 150 at 40.
 32. Id. ¶ 159 at 43.
 33. Enron Annulment Committee, supra note 30, ¶ 405 at 161-62.
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the Tribunal’s perspective, these differences can be explained with 
distinct legal interpretations of the “Argentine-U.S. BIT” and evalua-
tion of the facts in each case.  Apart from that, the Sempra Tribunal 
admitted that its two arbitrators also sat on the CMS Tribunal.  Argu-
ably however, the Tribunal’s Constitution influenced their conclu-
sion. Arbitrators were not more convinced than the CMS and Enron 
Tribunals about the influence of the economic crisis over the gov-
ernment’s actions against investors.  Consequently, the Sempra Tri-
bunal did not accept Argentine’s defense concerning the “state of ne-
cessity”; however, it acknowledged that economic situations might 
affect the value of investment and compensation issue.34 
The Sempra Tribunal pointed out that “state of necessity” was 
regulated by customary international law, not “Article XI of the 
BIT.”  The Tribunal explained that treaty provisions are generally 
more specific than customary laws.  However, the Sempra Tribunal 
does not indicate that “Argentine-U.S. BIT” contains any prerequi-
sites for a “necessity defense.” Therefore, one must inevitably look 
for the “state of necessity” requirements under customary law, not in 
Article XI.35 
After these considerations, the Sempra Tribunal concluded Arti-
cle XI of the BIT was not self-judging, and, because the requirements 
of necessity in customary international law were not met, there was 
no need for further judicial review under Article XI of the BIT.36 In 
the Sempra annulment proceedings, the Committee concluded the 
Tribunal did not implement Article XI of the BIT as an applicable 
law, and it therefore exceeded its powers by failing to implement Ar-
ticle XI of the BIT.37 The Sempra Committee indicated that as long as 
Article XI could be applied to the dispute, it was not possible to 
comment on breach of the BIT because Article XI confines the obli-
gations derived from the treaty. Unlike Article XI of the BIT, Article 
25 of the ILC Draft 2001 is a supplementary rule for precluding 
wrongfulness. Moreover, the state of necessity in Article 25 does not 
 34. Sempra Energy Int’l v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award,
¶ 346 at 102-03.
 35. Id. ¶ 378 at 111.
 36. Id. ¶ 388 at 114.
 37. Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 214-219 at 46.
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remove or terminate an international obligation.38 It looks like both 
the Sempra and CMS Committees chose the same path on the legal 
ground for annulment. Both the Sempra and CMS Tribunals ignored 
the applicability of Article XI of the BIT and considered that if the 
state of necessity requirements were not met under customary inter-
national law, there is no need to examine applicability of the BIT. 
Nevertheless, some authors assert that neither Article XI nor the 
U.S.-Argentine BIT are lex specialis. Furthermore, they deny the
view that Article XI of the BIT is self-executing.39 These authors par-
ticularly assert the BIT does not constitute a self-contained regime
distinct from general international law. They also claim the text of
Article XI is not the same as Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001; thus,
the customary international law excuse of necessity is not applicable
to Article XI.40 However, the authors accept that general international
law, especially customary international law, may be significant for
interpreting the BIT. As such, the treaty must be construed under the
 38. Id. ¶ 115, at 20.
 39. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 417-424. These authors strongly oppose the
Burke-White’s and von Staden’s views regarding the review of NPM clauses in BITs
with the standard of “good faith” or accepting such clauses as “self-judging” provi-
sions. See, William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Ex-
traordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 337-341 (2008).
Burke-White and von Staden asserted that the United States and Argentine intended
“Article XI of the BIT” to be “self-judging” and subject only to a “good faith review”
which is the core of international law; therefore, they indicate that the CMS, Enron,
and Sempra Tribunals misinterpreted the “Article XI of the BIT.” Indeed, the authors’
conclusions are similar to the ad hoc Committees’ annulment decisions regarding
those Tribunals’ Awards. See, Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 37, ¶ 127. The
Sempra Committee decided that “by disregarding the self-judging nature of Article XI,
the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers.” Compare with, Enron Annulment
Committee, supra note 30, ¶¶ 401-402, 406. The Enron Committee considered that
this is not its duty to determine whether the Tribunal’s finding concerning the Article
XI is not a “self-judging” provision. Instead of that, the Committee annulled the
Award of the Tribunal due to the preclusion of Argentine by the Tribunal for resorting
on the “Article XI of the BIT” and the “principle of necessity” under the “customary
international law.”
 40. See, e.g., Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 428; Andrea K. Bjorklund, Economic
Security Defenses in International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009, 495-496 (Karl P.
Sauvant, ed., 2009). Bjorklund endorsed the view of Alvarez and Khamsi concerning
the phrase of “essential security interests” indicating that the drafters of BIT aimed to
preserve customary law principles of the force majeure, distress, and necessity. Ac-
cording to him, the customary law would provide better protection than the BIT in
case of a contrary conclusion.
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terms of customary international law that parties explicitly or implic-
itly intended to incorporate.41 
To the contrary, other authors who support the CMS, Enron, and 
Sempra Annulment Committees’ decisions, indicated that, despite the 
fact that ad hoc committees were not authorized to annul awards by 
“errors in law,” these judicial bodies found the errors which they de-
tected.42 Thus, these Committees determined that Article XI of the 
BIT and Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001 separately exist and have dif-
ferent requirements. Likewise, William Burke-White and Andreas 
von Staden defend the idea of utilizing the clauses of “non-precluded 
measures” (NPM) in BITs such as Article XI of the U.S.-Argentine 
BIT. They suggest that, in the case of an NPM clause not being “self-
judging,” arbitral tribunals can follow up with the doctrine of “mar-
gin of appreciation.”43 Diane Desierto masterfully explains the differ-
ence between circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of States’ 
actions under customary international law and treaty-based non-
precluded measures undertaken by States. Desierto points out that 
when interpreting a treaty, law-appliers must focus on the necessity 
clause within a specific treaty and avoid any assumptions about other 
norms in “general international law” such as Article 25 of the ILC 
Draft 2001.44 Hereby, law-appliers must contemplate whether the in-
vestment treaty permits use of necessity as a justification.45 
In my opinion, this discernment is helpful to understand some 
differences between necessity regulation in customary international 
law and public order regulation in the specific treaty. General interna-
tional law, especially customary international law can be a useful tool 
for interpretation of international agreements pursuant to Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; however, 
this does not mean similar provisions should be overlapped as an ar-
ticle in a treaty and as a provision in customary international law. 
Both of them separately subsist under international law. 
However, the complexity of the issue may have originated from 
the separate foundations of international investment law. Stephan 
 41. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 465.
 42. Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 930-931.
 43. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 39, at 379.
 44. DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES,
18 (2012).
 45. Id. at 185.
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Schill demonstrates this point specifically from the perspective of in-
vestment law. He contemplates investment law as a “discipline that 
may be more open than other areas of international law in permitting 
different conceptual and methodological approaches.”46 He also as-
serts that investment law must be considered using a State-market re-
lationship with economic and political interests rather than reference 
to technical grounds relating to jurisprudence.47 
2. Economic Analysis of International Investment Law
2.1. Theoretical Approaches
Recently, some writers question investment law from an eco-
nomic perspective which might be called “economic analysis of law.” 
Economic analysis of law asserts that financial crises are derived 
from inadequate and inaccurate policies of governments. As one of 
the supporters of the economic analysis of law, Alan Sykes states that 
the host countries’ fiscal and monetary policies frequently contribute 
to financial crises; therefore, he asserts that if a necessity defense is 
upheld, it can cause a substantial moral hazard.48 He also showed the 
possibility of liability of public officials from public policies even if 
actual investment law does not contain it.49 Likewise, Daron Ace-
moglu and James Robinson considered that international organiza-
tions (such as the IMF) advise developing countries that macroeco-
nomic issues are not always successful because public officials do not 
often comply with their advice.50 Actually, this opinion was accepted 
by some of the tribunals mentioned above. Those tribunals admitted 
that economic policies of the Argentine government contributed to 
the crisis.51 Nevertheless, economic analysis of law under various sit-
uations can favor host States. For example, assuming a contractually 
unaddressed risk occurs in an investment, if the relevant risk was (or 
should have been) known by the investor, a tribunal may dismiss the 
request for damages unless property is seized without compensation. 
 46. Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of In-
ternational Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903 (2011).
 47. Id. at 904-905.
 48. Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 296,
313 (2015) (author’s observations on fiscal and currency crises).
 49. Id. at 315.
 50. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL, 446-447 (2013).
 51. See, e.g., CMS Award, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at ¶ 329.
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In such a case, economists can help tribunals determine whether the 
relevant risk is acceptable as an investment risk.52 
Examination of public international law disputes through a con-
tractual basis approach or economic analysis of law is not a new idea. 
Approximately one hundred years ago, the Tribunal of the Russian 
Indemnity53 case did this review.54 This case concerned indemnity for 
losses suffered by Russian subjects during the 1877-1878 war with 
Turkey. In 1879, Russia and Turkey signed the Peace Treaty in Istan-
bul. Article V of the Peace Treaty governed indemnity.55 Although 
partial payments were made, the Turkish government postponed 
payment for more than twenty years. In 1902, Turkey made the out-
standing payment, but Russia demanded interest for the delayed 
payment. Turkey objected to the Russian demand for interest and as-
serted “Article V of the Treaty of Peace of 1879 and the Protocol of 
the same date [did] not provide for interest.”56 
The parties agreed to take the dispute to an arbitral tribunal. Tur-
key pled economic exigency, among other things. The Tribunal ac-
cepted that Turkey was, from 1881 to 1902 under financial difficul-
ties. But, Russia asserted that “during this same period and especially 
following the establishment of the Ottoman Bank, Turkey was able to 
obtain some loans at favorable rates, to redeem other loans, and, fi-
nally, to pay off a large part of its public debt, estimated at 
350,000,000 francs.”57 The Tribunal understood that if the plea were 
upheld, it would be many times more than the small sum of about six 
million francs for actual Russian losses.  Thus, it dismissed this de-
fense because the conditions for force majeure were not met.58 From 
 52. Bastian Gottschling & Willis Geffert, An Economic Assessment of Contracts, Re-
quests for Contract Reform, and Damages in International Arbitration, in THE USE OF 
ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 319, 326 (Marion
Jansen, et al. eds., 2017).
 53. See Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities (Russ. v. Turk.), Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1912) [hereinafter Russian Indemnity].
 54. See also Sloane, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 460-61.
 55. Russian Indemnity, supra note 53, at 4.
 56. Id. at 7.
 57. Id.  at 13.
 58. The Tribunal described this plea as force majeure but today this defense conforms to
“state of necessity.” See, Sloane, supra note 33, at 460. Indeed, Russia in its Reply de-
scribed the “state of necessity”:
“The exception of force majeure cited as the most important may be pleaded in opposition in 
public as well as in private international law; international law must adapt itself to po-
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an economic perspective, the judgment of the Tribunal is quite signif-
icant. Although this was an inter-State arbitration, the Tribunal dealt 
with the case as a classic creditor-debtor relation. However, the Rus-
sian claim, notwithstanding the economic exigency defense, was re-
jected because Russia had not explicitly demanded interest for dam-
ages before the payment.59 
The idea of the “conservative analysis of law” requires isolation 
of other disciplines and circumstances from the legal instruments. 
This idea protects international law from any interference from other 
disciplines.60 For instance, when handling the relationship between 
investment law and development, most of the scholars contemplate 
these disciplines as rival rather than as supportive.61 However, the 
fear of some scholars is that if other factors are incorporated into the 
investment law it may reduce the level of investment protection in in-
ternational law. Therefore, this approach endorses the notion that in-
vestment treaties must be interpreted in the context of international 
law.62 The primary concern is whether such human rights and envi-
ronmental issues will become dominant factors in investment dis-
putes. But, that anxiety is also thinkable for economic matters. 
Dunoff and Trachtman competently describe the fears of “conserva-
tives” about the legal matters. According to them, many international 
lawyers hesitate to use economics because of a lack of confidence in 
litical necessities. The Imperial Russian Government expressly admits that the obliga-
tion of a State to fulfill treaties may give way “if the very existence of the State should 
be in danger if the observance of the international duty is . . . self-destructive.” See, 
Russian Indemnity, Award, at 12. 
 59. Id. at 15.
 60. LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 395-397 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker
Röben eds., 2008).
 61. Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann, International Investment
Law and Development: Friends or Foes? in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, 41 (Stephan W. Schill et al.
eds., 2015).
 62. MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 78-79 (2010). But see, Charles H. Brower, Obstacles and
Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009,
378 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009). Brower points out that there is no international
definition of the “public interest” in international law. However, the author suggests
that arbitration tribunals not only engage with investors’ protection but also the
humanitarian consideration in the disputes. Therefore, he calls for arbitration tribunals
to utilize the “public interest” concept with more transparency and systematically.
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their quantitative and economic skills.  However, the authors point 
out that many types of economic analysis of law do not require com-
plex mathematical tools.63 Indeed, apart from damage calculations, 
international law does not involve complex mathematical processes.64 
Despite that, use of economic tools other than the damage calculation 
is very rarely used in investment arbitration.65 
2.2. The Practice of “Investment Definition” in ICSID 
Another important issue for economic analysis of law in invest-
ment disputes is the definition of “investment” and its requirements. 
In this regard, the “Salini test” is at the center of debates. This test de-
fines the “investment” involving the “contribution of money or as-
sets,” “a certain duration of performance of the contract,” “participa-
tion in the risks of the transaction” and the “contribution to the 
economic development of host State,” which is derived from the 
ICSID Convention’s Preamble.66 The first three conditions exist in 
the doctrine, but the fourth condition is developed by the Salini Tri-
bunal. This last criterion has become very controversial in judicial 
practice. While some of the tribunals have accepted this criterion67, 
 63. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 7 (1999). The authors considered that the concerns of international
jurists about the law & economics (L&E) could be described with three main thoughts:
1) L&E’s seemingly inaccessible methodologies, 2) L&E’s supposedly conservative
political prejudices, 3) L&E’s positivism and its presumed denigration of international
law. Id. at 6.
 64. Pauwelyn states that both ICSID and WTO arbitrators calculated the damage amount
with a few paragraphs in their decisions in 2000’s years. But over the ten years after
these decisions, damages calculations have advanced amazingly. See, Joost Pauwelyn,
The Use, Non-use and Abuse of Economics in WTO and Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment, in WTO LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (Jorge A. Huerta-Goldman et al. eds., 2013).
Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141357 at 4. 
 65. Id. at 15.
 66. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case
No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 42, INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS, ¶ 52, at
622 (2003).
 67. See, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 14, ICSID
Rev/FILJ, ¶ 64, at 273 (1999). Following decisions have evolved the fourth criterion
from “contribution to the economic development” to “significance of the contribution
to the economic development.” See; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 53, at 12, Bayindir
Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137, at 37, Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging In-
ternational N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 91-92, at 29,
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others have rejected it.68 Schreuer describes this situation as unfortu-
nate because the Salini test criteria should not be accepted as strict ju-
risdictional requirements that each one of them must be met separate-
ly.69 He also indicated that even if one international transaction 
cannot “contribute to the host State’s economic development,” it does 
not mean that this operation must be excluded from ICSID Conven-
tion’s protection.70 Many of ICSID Tribunals have followed specific 
investment definitions in relevant BITs and accepted various finan-
cial tools such as loans, promissory notes, and minority stock shares 
as investments. However, after the Salini decision, ICSID Tribunals 
show reluctance to accept this broad investment definition.71 For in-
stance, in the Malaysian Salvors case, the Tribunal did not recognize 
a marine salvage contract as an investment because it is not capable 
of providing a significant “contribution to the host State’s economic 
development” and could not benefit Malaysian public interest.72 The 
Joy Mining case is another example of the application of strict in-
vestment requirements.  In this dispute, the Tribunal did not qualify 
either mixed contract or relevant bank guarantees and pledges as an 
investment.73 Despite the Tribunal’s decisions, it was aware of many 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 131, at 45. 
 68. Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 111, at 36
(The Tribunal concluded that the condition of the “contribution to the economic devel-
opment of host state” is one of the objectives of ICSID Convention, this objective is
not one of the criteria of investment), Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA v.
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award (English translation from ICSID), ¶
13(iv), at 21 (The Tribunal considered that there is no separate condition regarding the
“contribution of the investment to the host country’s economic development” and ac-
cepted that this criterion takes part implicitly in the other three criteria.).
 69. THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, ¶171 at 133 (Christoph H.
Schreuer et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009). He also added that the Salini Tribunal emphasized
that investment criteria should be contemplated in conjunction. See, Salini v. Morocco,
Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 66, ¶ 52 at 622.
 70. Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 173 at 134; See also, Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning
of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law,
51 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 274 (2010).
 71. Id. at 279. In the same way, Schreuer points out that if “contribution to the economic
development” criterion will be applied by the tribunals, arbitrators must show some
flexibility. He also suggests that arbitrators should not seek the criterion of contribu-
tion to host state’s GDP necessarily. See, Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 174 at 134.
 72. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. The Government of Malaysia, supra note 67, ¶¶ 125-
131, at 43-45 [hereinafter Salvors].
 73. Joy Mining v. Egypt, supra note 67, ¶ 55, at 13.
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ICSID decisions that had given a wider purview to the investment 
definition. But, it analyzed that other cases have undoubtedly had in-
vestment operation or an arbitration clause in their contracts. Accord-
ing to the Tribunal, a “sale or procurement contract,” even if it has 
sophisticated features, should not qualify as an investment.74 
Before that narrow interpretation of investment definition oc-
curred in the jurisprudence, some tribunals such as the Fedax Tribu-
nal applied the broad interpretation of investment definition test. The 
Fedax Tribunal evaluated promissory notes as an investment because 
of their benefits for the Venezuela Treasury derived from the exist-
ence of fundamental national interests indicated in Venezuela’s “Law 
on Public Credit.”75 The Tribunal also pointed out that the term “di-
rectly” in Article 25 of ICSID Convention connected with the “dis-
pute” and not the “investment.” Hence, jurisdictional requirements of 
ICSID are met as long as a dispute directly emerges from an econom-
ic transaction, even if this operation has not been qualified as direct 
investment by itself.76 Similarly, the CSOB Tribunal quoted the Fe-
dax decision and clarified that issue. The CSOB Tribunal decided to 
follow the Fedax Tribunal’s interpretation of the definition of in-
vestment. According to the CSOB Tribunal, an investment generally 
consists of several linked transactions, however, some transactions 
may not, by itself, be qualified as an investment. Although, in terms 
of the jurisdictional requirements of ICSID, it is important to deter-
mine if the whole operation can be qualified as an investment inde-
pendent from its sub-transactions.77 
Holiday Inns v. Morocco is a significant case that is a predeces-
sor of the decisions mentioned above. The Tribunal evaluated sepa-
rate loan contracts within the “general unity of an investment opera-
 74. Id, ¶¶ 58-59, at 14.
 75. Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (July 11, 1997), 37 INT’L LEGAL
MATERIALS ¶ 42 at 1386 (1998). But see Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box:
Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 720-721 (2007).
Waibel asserts that so-called “public interest” test does not convert a commercial
transaction to the investment. He also considered that such a test does not satisfy the
jurisdictional conditions in the Article 25 of ICSID Convention.
 76. Fedax v. Venez., supra note 75, ¶ 24, at 1383.
 77. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, supra note 67, ¶ 72,
at 275.
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tion.”78 It considered that isolating some juridical acts from others is 
not coherent with economic reality and parties’ intentions.79 Travaux 
préparatoires of the ICSID Convention shows that various attempts 
for limitation of investment definition failed. Consequently, with an 
endorsement of some delegates, the United Kingdom delegate pro-
posed to exclude the investment definition for hampering jurisdic-
tional obstacles and it was accepted by the Legal Committee.80 
Recent developments in investment cases show that the “Salini 
effect”, which identified an investment with a mandatory list of char-
acteristics, is losing its influence.81 The Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania 
case can be seen as a cornerstone. In this case, the Tribunal explicitly 
emphasized that the “Salini criteria” are not compulsory as a matter 
of law and there is no legal basis in the ICSID Convention for apply-
ing strict requirements.82 Therefore, according to the Tribunal, these 
criteria are not applicable to all disputes. Hence an appropriate ap-
proach must consider all features of the case, particularly the relevant 
legal instruments which consent to ICSID arbitration.83 Another ex-
ample, in the same way, is the Malaysian Salvors Annulment Deci-
sion. Malaysian Salvors Ad Hoc Committee quoted the Biwater 
Gauff Award for pointing out the danger of the inflexible “Salini cri-
teria.” With reference to the relevant passage, if tribunals adhere to 
the “Salini criteria,” there will appear a definitional contradiction be-
tween agreements or treaties and the Salini definition.84 Consequent-
 78. Pierre Lalive, The First World Bank Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Le-
gal Problems, 51 BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 159 (1981).
 79. See Id. Besides the above, some other tribunals mentioned this decision, and when
determining whether an investment exists, they examined the entire operation. See also
Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 110, at 31.
 80. See, Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 115, at 115.
 81. David A. R. Williams & Simon Foote, Recent Developments in the Approach to Iden-
tifying an “Investment” Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION, 63 (Ches-
ter Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
 82. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 312-313 at 86 (July 24, 2008).
 83. Id. ¶¶ 313-316, at 86-87.
 84. Id. ¶ 316 at 87; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Ma-
laysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 79,
at 33-35 (July 24, 2008).
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ly, the Committee annulled the Tribunal’s Award in accordance with 
“Article 52(1)(b) of ICSID Convention.”85 
I am of the opinion that these last decisions can be considered as 
a recovery in ICSID case law through the acknowledgment of a non-
restrictive investment definition for the jurisdictional requirement. 
When some tribunals begin to add supplemental conditions to the 
Salini criteria, jurisdictional thresholds are getting higher.86 There-
fore, this recovery in the case law is consistent with the intentions of 
the ICSID Convention drafters and purposes of the Convention. Es-
pecially, as Williams and Foote stated, the requirement of “signifi-
cant contribution to the economy of the host state” is severely weak-
ened in practice.87 Actually, this fluctuation either in “investment 
definition” or “state of necessity” in ICSID case law can be explained 
by a different problem, that of State sovereignty.88 Brower and Schill 
defined this problem under the “legitimacy” term and elucidated this 
issue about investment arbitrations as beyond the problems of pre-
dictability and consistency.89 According to them, critiques about the 
 85. Id. ¶ 80 at 35. The reasons of the annulment by the Committee are; i) Tribunal’s lim-
ited analysis relating to Article 25 of ICSID Convention ii) to fail reviewing the Con-
vention’s preparatory work iii) disregarding small contributions to the host state’s
economy such as cultural or historical contributions.
 86. See generally, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/5, Award (April 15, 2009). In this dispute, the Tribunal added two criteria to
the Salini test. These supplemental criteria are; i) assets invested with bona fide and ii)
assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State. Id, ¶ 114, at 45. Particu-
larly, good faith (bona fide) investment criterion is controversial. This criterion can be
criticized from the different aspects. First, the “good faith” is one of the “general prin-
ciples of law” which be applied to the international law, but it was not contemplated as
the jurisdictional condition by drafters of the ICSID Convention. Second, this principle
is only usable for supportive argument in the reasoning of Tribunal which serves for
treaty-based arbitrations. Finally, characterization of investment as “illegal in host
state law” or “not made in good faith” does not change qualification of investment in
the international arena. See Saba Fakes v. Turkey, supra note 68, ¶¶ 112-113, at 36-37.
Unlike the Phoenix Tribunal, the Saba Fakes Tribunal even though it did not use the
“good faith” principle and restrictive investment definition, it concluded that had not
been made any investment by the claimant. Id, ¶147, at 47.  Some authors have explic-
itly expressed their concerns about the various financial instruments and non-
infrastructure contracts which are under risk of exclusion from the investment defini-
tion in ICSID practice. See, Mortenson, supra note 70, at 279.
 87. David A. R. Williams & Simon Foote, supra note 80, at 63.
 88. See, Mortenson, supra note 70, at 312-313.
 89. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Le-
gitimacy of International Investment Law, 9 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 471, 473-74,
(2009).
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issue consist of two distinct thoughts. The first view is the “Marxist 
analysis of law” which asserted that investment law is an attempt by 
developed countries to impose their power on developing countries. 
The second view defends that investment law is an unequal regime 
which protects foreign investors and their properties; although, this 
regime does not ensure sufficient discretion to the host States for 
their non-investment benefits.90 Nevertheless, the last view has be-
come the effective background of some recent cases. 
2.3. Non-Investment Factors and the Doctrine of “Margin of Ap-
preciation” 
The recent case of Philip Morris v. Uruguay is a good example 
of non-investment factors’ effects on the investment dispute. In this 
case, the Tribunal reviewed each relevant measure adopted by na-
tional agencies relating to the tobacco consumption.91Despite claim-
ants’ objections, arbitrators used the doctrine of “margin of apprecia-
tion” in this dispute because this doctrine is not only peculiar to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR), but is 
also applicable to bilateral investment treaties especially in “public 
health” issues.92 That is not the first case which an ICSID Tribunal 
applied a “margin of appreciation.” Before this recent case, the Con-
tinental Casualty v. Argentine Tribunal explicitly applied this doc-
trine in another case, which involved another dispute derived from 
Argentine’s economic crisis. In this case, the Tribunal decided that 
Article XI of Argentine-U.S. BIT is not “self-judging.” Nonetheless, 
the Tribunal stated that Article XI of the BIT contained a “margin of 
appreciation” inherent to each party which invokes it.93 
 90. Id. at 474.
 91. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 388 at 111.
 92. Id. ¶¶ 398-399 at 115.
 93. Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 181, 187-188 at 80, 82-83. The Tribunal justified its conclusion
with the United States argument in the Oil Platforms case. According to the Continen-
tal Casualty Tribunal, the Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of the 1955 Iran-United States
Amity Treaty had provided to the parties a “margin of discretion.” Nonetheless, ICJ
decided that the “self-defense” concept has no ground for the doctrine of the “margin
of discretion” due to its strict requirements. See, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, ¶ 73 at 196. There-
fore, Continental Casualty Tribunal underlined that accepting “margin of discretion”
in the measures might give rise getting rid of treaty obligations by a party which has
been undertaken these measures. But also, the Tribunal has considered that the time of
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When we turn back again to the Philip Morris case, the dissent-
ing opinion of Gary Born is worth mentioning. He indicated that 
“margin of appreciation” relied on the language of the ECHR and its 
Protocols (especially the first Protocol); therefore, the Tribunal 
should not transplant this doctrine from the ECHR to the relevant 
BIT (Uruguay-Switzerland) or the customary international law.94 He 
continued that the ECHR interprets their Article 1 of Protocol 1to be 
very extensive in the expropriation of properties by governments and 
gives wide range “margin of appreciation” to the governmental au-
thorities about what constitutes “public interest” in the act of expro-
priation.95 In contrast, there is no equivalent provision in the Uru-
guay-Switzerland BIT. Also, travaux préparatoires, also known as the 
official records of negotiation, of the BIT does not indicate whether 
parties intended to accept the “margin of appreciation.”96 
These inferences of the Born’s dissenting opinion are in line with 
thoughts of the Judge Anzilotti in the Oscar Chinn case. Judge An-
zilotti stated that “international law would be merely an empty phrase 
if it sufficed for a State to invoke the public interest in order to evade 
the fulfillment of its engagements.”97 ICJ and ICSID Tribunals con-
formed to this approach and rejected to apply the doctrine of “margin 
of appreciation” in various cases.98 For instance, in the Construction 
severe economic crisis provides significant “margin of discretion” to the host States in 
their measures. See also, Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 39, at 375. The au-
thors support the utilization of “margin of appreciation” doctrine in international in-
vestment law. For the authors, that doctrine especially has importance to preserve le-
gitimacy in investor-State arbitration. Therefore, arbitral tribunals may apply the NPM 
clauses in the BITs. Burke-White and von Staden suggest that different indications can 
be applied by the tribunals depending on the nature of the dispute. For instance, while 
have been granting maximum deference to the States in “public morality” issues; on 
the other hand, that deference to the States’ measures could be at the minimum level in 
the “public health” issues which are more scientific.  
 94. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Gary Born, supra note 91, Annex B, ¶ 138 at
33.
 95. Id. ¶ 183 at 42.
 96. Id. ¶184, at 42.
 97. The Oscar Chinn Case (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, 65,
112 (Dec.12), (separate opinion by Anzilotti, M.). U.K. v. Belgium, 1934 P.C.I.J. at
184.
 98. Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 91, ¶186-190 (This case is a great example of
how non-investment factors can effect an investment dispute. This is one of the rare
cases where the Tribunal reviews each measure adopted by national agencies as it re-
lated to tobacco consumption and ultimately applied the ‘margin of appreciation.’).
See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
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of a Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ decided that the route of the 
wall, which was chosen by Israel, could not be justified by the re-
quirements of “public order” and “national security.” Therefore, ac-
cording to the Court, this wall construction breaches Israel’s obliga-
tions under international humanitarian law.99 The ICJ considered that 
Israel could not invoke “self-defense” under UN Charter Article 51 or 
“state of necessity” under the customary international law for the 
prevention of the wrongfulness of the construction of a wall.100 An-
other example from the ICJ’s jurisprudence is the Whaling in the 
Antarctica case, which was rendered by the Court recently. This case 
is remarkable regarding the respondent’s allegations about having a 
“margin of appreciation” in scientific research related to the whales. 
In response to that claim, the ICJ considered that “the killing, taking, 
and treating of whales pursuant to a requested special permit is for 
purposes of scientific research cannot depend simply on that State’s 
perception.”101 Instead of the using the “margin of appreciation” 
standard, which was claimed by the respondent, the ICJ preferred the 
concept of “standard of review”, which is known from the “World 
Trade Organization” (WTO) jurisprudence.102 
It seems that if a treaty does not grant the “margin of apprecia-
tion” in the 
acts of State parties such as Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, 
the doctrine must not be applied by the international judicial bodies. 
The argument of the “international judicial bodies has inherent power 
to use this doctrine” cannot justify the issue.103 The “margin of appre-
Law? 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 931-940 (2005), “for the critiques about ICJ decisions 
which rejected to apply the ‘margin of appreciation.’” 
 99. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 193, ¶ 137 (July 9).
 100. Id. ¶ 142 at 195.
 101. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 61 (Mar.
31).
 102. Theodore Christakis, The “Margin of Appreciation” in the Use of Exemptions in In-
ternational Law: Comparing the ICJ Whaling Judgment and the Case Law of the EC-
tHR (2015), in WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC: SIGNIFICANCE AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICJ JUDGMENT, 2016, 139, 151-54 (Malgosia Fitzmau-
rice & Dai Tamada eds., 2016). The author assumes that even if ICJ would use the
“margin of appreciation” doctrine, the conclusion will not change in favor of respond-
ent due to the hardness of accepting the killing of whales under the name of scientific
research for the interest of the State.
 103. See Shany, supra note 98, at 911.
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ciation” is neither accepted as the “international customary rule” nor 
the “general principle of law.” For elaboration on the issue, examin-
ing the “International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (hereinafter, 
ITLOS) cases may be useful as they relate to the prompt release of 
vessels and crews might be useful. For instance, in the Juno Trader 
case, the ITLOS demonstrated which principles prevail when as-
sessing reasonable bond in the prompt release cases. Accordingly, 
Article 73 of the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” 
(hereinafter, UNCLOS) must be evaluated in the light of considera-
tions of humanity and due process of law. The requirement of reason-
able bond in prompt release of vessels and crews 
follow this approach.104 
The ITLOS chose to follow well-established legal principles in-
stead of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine in the prompt release 
procedure under the Article 73 of UNCLOS.105 This preference of the 
ITLOS seems to have originated from its avoidance of non-well-
established concepts and doctrines in international law such as “mar-
gin of appreciation.” “Considerations of humanity” and “due process 
of law” are rooted legal principles compared to “margin of apprecia-
tion.” The ICJ applied the principle of “considerations of humanity” 
in the Corfu Channel case for the first time,106 but it has not main-
tained the same approach afterward.107 After the inauguration of the 
 104. Juno Trader (No. 13) (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 13, Judgment of Dec.
18, 2004, 1 ¶ 77, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 77, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
 105. In his study, Judge Cot construed that the observation of the ITLOS is not contrary to
the “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Jean-Pierre Cot, The Law of the Sea and the
Margin of Appreciation, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A.
MENSAH, 389, 403 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007).
 106. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 22 (Apr.
9). The Court indicated that “elementary considerations of humanity” is general and
well recognized principle. Id. at 22.
 107. In the South West Africa cases, ICJ did not accept that “humanitarian considerations”
can generate legal rights and obligations. The Court admitted that all states have inter-
ests in such matters, but these considerations have not the juridical character. South
West Africa Cases (Eth.& Libya v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 34, ¶ 49-50
(July 18). However, these reviews have not welcomed by some judges. For example,
Judge Jessup stated that for long years international law recognized that states have le-
gal interests other than economic or material issues. South West Africa Cases (Eth. &
Libya v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 425 (Dec. 21)
(separate opinion by Jessup, P.). Judge Tanaka also supported to the Judge Jessup and
illustrated that states have legal interests in humanitarian issues such as suppression of
slave trade, the Genocide Convention and the constitution of the International Labor
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ITLOS, this consideration was revived in the practice of international 
law.108 In addition to the ITLOS,109 also some arbitral tribunals110 
which were constituted pursuant to Annex VII of UNCLOS, utilized 
the principle of “considerations of humanity.” Nevertheless, some au-
thors criticized this principle because it was not used enough in State 
practice.111 
Even well-established principles such as “considerations of hu-
manity” have been criticized by some scholars in international law 
for the lack of the justification when they are used by the internation-
al judicial bodies. Hence, it was inevitable that the doctrine of “mar-
gin of appreciation” would also be critiqued.112 At this point, the 
ECHR also has been criticized for using the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine. Accordingly, that doctrine threatens fundamental rights and 
Organization. South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 252 (July 18) (dissenting 
opinion by Tanaka, K.). 
 108. ABDULKADİR G.L.R., ULUSLARARASI DENIZ HUKUKU MAHKEMESININ YAPISI VE 
YARGI YETKISI, 65 (Onikilevha , 1st ed. 2017).
 109. See, The M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1,
1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 1, 22 at ¶155. “In considering the force used by Guinea in the ar-
rest of the Saiga, the Tribunal must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in
the context of the applicable rules of international law. Although the Convention does
not contain express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international
law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the
use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must
not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations
of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international
law.”) (emphasis added).
 110. The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (It. v. India), Case No. 2015-28, Order, 1, ¶ 104, 106 at
27 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1707. Here, the Tri-
bunal considered that it should give effect to the principle of “considerations of hu-
manity” for relaxation to bail conditions of Italian marine Sergeant Girone.
 111. Koskenniemi who well-known with his critiques in the international law indicated that
no State would deny “elementary considerations of humanity” principle which has
been accepted for the practice of their inter-State relations. Martti Koskenniemi, From
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 167 (2006). Af-
terward, he argued that whether this norm has enough past compliance in the State
practice for accepting as a customary law rule, is disputed. Id. at 408.  Chigara is an-
other writer who criticized the ITLOS and ICJ decisions for non-obeyance to the re-
quirements of the Article 38/1(b) of the ICJ Statute which involves opinio juris, State
practice, and the time element. Ben Chigara, International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea and Customary International Law, 22 LOY. LOS ANGELES INT’L & COMP. L. R.
433, 442-451 (2000). According to him, when an international court or tribunal resort
to a principle such as “considerations of humanity,” it must justify why it resorts to
this principle and clarifies State practice and other requirements. Id. at 445.
 112. Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J.
INT’L L. 545, 558 (2014).
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the rule of law.113 Brauch asserted that the ECHR’s European consen-
sus as it related to the “margin of appreciation” did not constitute a 
legal standard. Neither applicants nor the Member States of ECHR 
have enough information on how government actions can accommo-
date this European consensus.114 However, even in the context of the 
ECHR, the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” has rarely been im-
plemented, especially in “right to life” or “prohibition of torture” cas-
es.115 This situation will likely change under Article 1 of Protocol 15 
of the ECHR.116 This provision entrenched the “margin of apprecia-
tion” doctrine to the ECHR dispute settlement system. The deference 
of State actions will be more comprehensive than it used to be in the 
past after adding that doctrine to the Preamble of the ECHR. Howev-
er, alteration as mentioned above in the Preamble of ECHR does not 
cover all of international law. Each dispute settlement system 
(UNCLOS, ICSID, WTO, etc.) must be assessed in the context of its 
legal instruments. This assessment must be made by their relevant 
dispute settlement bodies regarding whether it is required or not by 
looking either to deference or appreciation of a government’s acts in 
a dispute. 
To sum up, each principle or doctrine must be examined in detail 
when it will be applied to a particular dispute. For instance, it is not 
appropriate to use the doctrine of margin of appreciation in a dispute 
relating to a right to life or prohibition of torture argument. There-
fore, this doctrine must not be applied to such disputes. Apart from 
this, if a conflict involves humanitarian issues, the considerations of 
 113. See, Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113,
150 (2004).
 114. Id. at 145-46.
 115. BAŞAK ALI, The Authority of International Law, 82 (OUP Oxford, 2015) (The au-
thor describing the “margin of
appreciation” as a doctrine which rebuttable duties entail in the ECHR context, but claiming 
that the scope of rebuttal in the precedents of ECHR is very narrow or non-existent). 
 116. Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, June 24, 2013, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R (2013), “At the end of
the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be added, which shall read as fol-
lows: Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined
in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin
of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights established by this Convention.”) (emphasis added).
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humanity principle can be applied to that case instead of an economic 
analysis of law application. Wrongful implementation of a principle 
or doctrine would undermine the legitimacy of international judicial 
bodies and fair expectations of them. On the other hand, if a dispute 
has an intensive economic character, such as an investment dispute or 
trade dispute, the economic analysis of law principle can be applied 
to it. Hence, investment disputes or trade disputes are not suitable for 
applying doctrines such as humanitarian consideration or margin of 
appreciation unless an explicit treaty provision exists. 
3. The Public Interest in International Investment Law
3.1. The Debate on the Concept of Public Interest
Above, the relevance of the public interest in the context of de-
fining what constitutes an investment was partially addressed. In this 
chapter, the issue will be comprehensively reviewed. As basic 
sources of international law, provisions in treaties and rules of cus-
tomary international law do not involve a uniform phrase about the 
public interest. Putting aside various usages, frequently utilized 
phrases are such things as public (national) security, public purpose, 
and public interest.117 States aim to provide broader regulatory free-
dom by placing such clauses in international treaties.118 A State’s 
right to regulate concerning the public interest has a different basis 
compared to the doctrines of state of necessity, national security, and 
public order.119 Nevertheless, even if a BIT does not involve a public 
interest exception clause, some assert that arbitral tribunals may con-
sider public interest review through their reliance on past arbitral de-
cisions rather than interpreting the relevant expression in a BIT.120 By 
 117. PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA & C. RYAN REETZ, PUBLIC PURPOSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW RETHINKING REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA, 126 (2015).
 118. Id. at 124-125.
 119. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 101 (2014). See also, Alison Giest, Interpreting Public Interest
Provisions in International Investment Treaties, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 334 (2017).
 120. Giest, supra note 119, at 328. However, various authors object to adoption of prece-
dents in international investment law. These authors assert that looking for consistency
in investment arbitration decisions is not suitable due to the type of dispute resolution.
Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 418, 421-422 (2013). See Alexander Orakhelash-
vili, Principles of Treaty Interpretation in the NAFTA Arbitral Award on Canadian
Cattlemen, 26 J. INT’L ARB., 159, 168-169 (2009). See also Stephan W. Schill, En-
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contrast, Aikaterini Titi’s comment on this issue is much more cau-
tious. According to Titi, if investment agreements have unambiguous 
public interest provisions, arbitrators must show deference to the host 
States’ regulations regarding the investment. If treaties do not involve 
such clauses, however, there is no mandatory situation for the tribu-
nals concerning whether to allow broader regulatory freedom for 
States.121 
Another part of the public interest regulation matter is possible 
demands for compensation. For clarification, it must be admitted that 
public interest exception clauses in international investment agree-
ments or treaties do not grant absolute police power to the host States 
for regulation of foreign investments. The Marvin Feldman v. Mexico 
case is a unique example to understand that question. In this dispute, 
the Tribunal acknowledged that governments have many ways to re-
duce the economic profit of businesses, which could be done through 
“confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or necessary 
raw materials, and the imposition of unreasonable regulatory re-
gimes.”122 The Tribunal also indicated that if reasonable governmen-
tal regulations such as bona fide general taxation or alternative ac-
tions can be accepted as a non-discriminatory treatment, they are 
within the regulatory power of governments and do not trigger State 
liability.123 Consequently, when a State undertakes international obli-
gations through investment treaties, it limits regulatory power, which 
originated from its sovereignty. As such, if a State goes beyond rea-
sonable regulation according to the relevant public interest provision 
in a treaty or in general international law, it will be exposed to liabil-
ity to the investor.124 To justly determine this distinction, arbitral tri-
bunals should consider various factors such as aims and characteris-
hancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 79, 84 (2011) (de-
scribing arbitral decisions which deny accepting precedents). 
 121. Titi, supra note 119, at 71.
 122. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 103 (Dec. 16, 2002), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf [hereinafter 
Feldman]. 
 123. Id. (stating that “[r]easonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved
if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say
that customary international law recognizes this”). See also Titi, supra note 119, at 34.
 124. See TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, 183 (2014).
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tics of the measures or proportionality between public interests and 
private interests. Those legal indicators determine which government 
actions or measures count as indirect expropriation.125 
A valuable critique directed to the public interest concept is its 
ineffectiveness in international adjudication. Pursuant to the main 
idea of that critique, international law is based on the consensual re-
gime, and, except for very few peremptory norms, States are free to 
make an agreement.126 Therefore, international law cannot adequately 
protect public interests because of its consensual structure. Govern-
ments always have a chance to back down from their international 
obligations by repealing treaties.127 Thus, Vaughan Lowe considers 
that protecting public interests is a struggle which can be realizable in 
the domestic legal arena rather than the international arena.128 With 
regard to ineffectiveness of the public interest idea in international 
investment law, there is concern international tribunals may curtail 
the regulatory power of governments, especially for regulations un-
dertaken to protect the environment or human rights.129 There are in-
sufficient sources that take into account the public interest as applica-
ble law in treaty-based investment arbitration. Therefore, tribunals 
hesitate to consider the public interest function because their deci-
sions would risk annulment.130 
3.2. Public Participation and Transparency in Investor-State Ar-
bitration 
One of the dimensions of the public interest concept reflects it-
self in the rising transparency trend in the international investment 
regime. The struggle between privacy and transparency in investment 
arbitration originates from the mixed structure of its proceedings, 
which involves features from both public international arbitration and 
 125. Id. at 225.
 126. Vaughan Lowe, Private Disputes and the Public Interest in International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 3, 13 (Duncan French et al., eds.,
2010). See Brower, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 372.
 127. Lowe, supra note 126, at 15.
 128. Id. at 16.
 129. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’
Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Propor-
tionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 75, 76
(Stephan W. Schill. ed., 2010).
 130. Brower, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 372.
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private international commercial arbitration.131 However, some de-
velopments in investment arbitration have decreased confidentiality 
in the proceedings.132 These developments can be construed as ac-
ceptance of broader transparency and underline the importance of 
representing the public interest in investor-State arbitration.133 Indeed, 
besides opening judicial proceedings to the public, transparency sepa-
rates investor-State arbitration from commercial arbitrations. For ex-
ample, the ICSID Secretariat routinely registers cases and provides 
information to the public unlike other arbitral institutes such as the 
ICC, LCIA, and SCC. During the 1980s, scholars complained about 
the confidentiality of the awards; however, most of the awards are 
now available to the public in accordance with Article 48(4) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules..134 To further transparency in proceedings, 
the UN General Assembly recently adopted the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.135 The 
UN General Assembly then adopted the United Nations Convention 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which 
entered into force on October 18, 2017.136 In accordance with Article 
 131. See Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: Issues, Chal-
lenges, and Possible Solutions, in PRACTISING VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, 17, 32 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015); Alessandra Asteriti & Chris-
tian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
LAW, 787, 788 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
 132. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL RULES ON 
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 6, at 10 (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-
transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Trans-
parency]; U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY art. 29(1)-(2), at 32 (2012),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model
BIT].
 133. Ruth Teitelbaum, A Look at The Public Interest in Investment Arbitration: Is It
Unique? What Should We Do About It? 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST, 54, 55
(2010).
 134. Asteriti and Tams, supra note 131, at 790. The authors categorize the views about
confidentiality in investor-state arbitration under three subheadings; the orthodox ap-
proach, moderate orthodox approach and unorthodox approach, id. at 789-92. They
considered the ICSID rules under moderate orthodoxy view subheading, id. at 790-91.
 135. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec.
18, 2013).
 136. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. para. 2, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/116 (Dec.
10, 2014). To date, the Convention (also known as the Mauritius Convention) has been
signed by 23 States, including the United States. Only five States (Canada, Switzer-
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2(1) of the Convention, the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
shall apply to any investor-State arbitration, whether or not initiated 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” unless the respondent State 
has not made a reservation as a Party of the Convention. According 
to Article 6, hearings must be public unless there is a confidentiality 
exception or a need to protect information. Despite these gains, as a 
rule, ICSID hearings are confidential Nevertheless, “unless either 
party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-
General, may allow other persons” to participate in the hearings.137 
Clearly, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency go beyond the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules and take care of the public interest as an es-
sential point in tribunal proceedings.138 
Another dimension of the public interest debate is its clash with 
the common interest in international law. The rising trend in regard to 
universal human values actually empowers the common interest of 
the international community against national public interests.139 For 
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the 
common interest concept, and it determined that “the object and pur-
pose of the [American Convention on Human Rights] is not the ex-
change of the reciprocal rights between a limited number of States, 
but the protection of the human rights of all individual human beings 
within the Americas, irrespective of their nationality.”140 Similarly, 
there is increased acceptance of the independence of human rights is-
sues in the doctrine, although these rights are reciprocal to those of 
land, Cameroon, Gambia, and Mauritius) have ratified the Convention thus far. Status 
of Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXII-
3&chapter=22&lang=en. (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). See also U.N. Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Feb. 19, 2015, 54 I.L.M. 751 
[hereinafter Mauritius Convention]. 
 137. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES [ICSID], 
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES r. 32(2), at 115 (2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES].
 138. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 132 art. 1(4), at 6.
 139. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
11 (2004).
 140. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on
Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 2, ¶ 27 (Sept. 24, 1982).
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the States.141 Bruno Simma commented more generally and conclud-
ed international law is entering a new stage where it eliminates the 
distinctions between governments; instead, it raises the pillar of 
common interests that belong to the whole international communi-
ty.142 Likewise, Louis Henkin agrees that universal human values 
gradually have superseded nation-State values in international law.143 
This thought also was demonstrated by Thomas Joseph Lawrence ap-
proximately one hundred years ago. He indicated that nations chased 
their interest naturally, but he asserted the policymakers should go 
beyond the public interest and make a more fair and well-founded in-
ternational system.144 He also pointed out it was a mistake to debate 
global controversies with patriotic sentiment, and he considered such 
disagreements national issues rather than international.145 
Investment disputes involve interest conflict between investors 
and States. However, in some instances regarding environmental is-
sues or human rights, common interests of the international commu-
nity become relevant.146 Arbitral tribunals may tend to take into con-
sideration “common interest” arguments as far as their relevance with 
parties’ benefits. However, increasing amicus curiae submissions and 
allegations of violation concerning rules of the environment protec-
tion and human rights in foreign investment cases reflect that “com-
mon interest” concept applicable to the international investment 
law.147 Even though, so far in the practice of investment arbitrations, 
defenses of States have not been progressed concerning the preserva-
tion of public interest due to human rights consideration. Likewise, 
amicus curiae submissions mostly lack justification about the public 
 141. See Yoshifumi Tanaka, Protection of Community Interests in International Law: The
Case of the Law of the Sea, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 329, 334-335 (2011).
 142. Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practition-
er, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L., 265, 268 (2009).
 143. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.,
31, 32-33 (1995).
 144. THOMAS JOSEPH LAWRANCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 15 (1910).
 145. Id. at 101.
 146. Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, From Individual to Community Interest in
International Investment Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY
INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, 1080 (Ulrich
Fastenrath, et al. eds., 2011).
 147. Id.  at 1096.
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interest concerns relating to the facts of disputes.148 Amicus curiae 
submissions may be accepted by the tribunals after consultations with 
parties of the dispute. There are some requirements in the non-
disputing party submissions which should be satisfied. First, such a 
submission must assist the tribunal in the decision making of a factu-
al or legal matter. Second, it must address the matter within the scope 
of a dispute. Third, a non-disputing party must have a substantial in-
terest in the proceeding.149 In the first drafts of 2006 amendments to 
ICSID Arbitration Rules article 37(2), non-disputing party defines as 
a “person or State.” This wording, however, was found too restrictive 
and changed as “person or entity.” There is no doubt that the “entity” 
term encompasses the States.150 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
elaborates the issue and separates the provisions as “submission by a 
third person” (art. 4) and “submission by a non-disputing party to the 
treaty” (art. 5). “Submission of a non-disputing party” also exist ef-
fects on the investment dispute. In this case, the Tribunal reviewed 
each relevant measure adopted in other fields of international law in 
addition to the investment law. In ECtHR, ICC, ICTY, and ICTR al-
low participation of Contracting States, organizations and persons as 
 148. Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Com-
munity Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 87 (2014).
The author gives the example of Suez v. Argentine case. In that case, Argentine and the
amicus curiae submissions asserted that population’s right to water enables ignoring
the obligations under the BITs even if those treaties do not contain such necessity
clauses. But the tribunal did not agree to this claim because neither BITs nor interna-
tional law provides an opportunity like that. In the view of the tribunal, human rights
and investment treaty obligations are respectively considerable and equal. Therefore,
they are not inconsistent or contradictory. See, Suez v. Argentine, Decision on Liabil-
ity, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (2010), ¶ 262. I am of the opinion that the conclusion
of the tribunal is correct, but it missed some features of the relationship between hu-
man rights and investment law. Both field separately exists under the international law,
but it does not mean that their obligations could not be rival or competitor in some dis-
putes. Therefore, there is a need for explanation in such circumstances about the com-
peting obligations and which one is more relevant in the context of the dispute. Admit-
tedly, it is crucial to choose the correct judicial body for the case either human rights
court or investment arbitration tribunal in such a dispute.
 149. See, Article 37(2) of ICSID Arbitration Rules. “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration” preserves first and third requirements how-
ever it excludes the second requirement in the determination of acceptance the written
submission of a non-disputing party. See, Article 4(3) of UNCITRAL Rules on Trans-
parency.
 150. Eloise Obadia, Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing
Party Participation in Investment Arbitration, 22 ICSID Rev/FILJ, 368 (2007).
ILS Journal of International Law Vol. VI, No. 2 
247 
amicus curiae, however, ICJ and ITLOS only accept States and inter-
national organizations for written submissions in advisory opinions or 
contentious proceedings as amicus curiae.151 
Positive sides of third-party submissions are enumerated as their 
assistance to provide predictability and stability of investment arbitra-
tion and to find the correct interpretation of the treaty.152 Also, there 
is another benefit which is asserted about the amicus curiae submis-
sions concerning their potential role in the preclusion of fragmenta-
tion in international law.153 AES v. Hungary case is exemplified in the 
doctrine regarding this assertion154 which the European Commis-
sion’s amicus curiae submission had been taken into consideration by 
the tribunal regarding the European Union’s (EU) position about the 
disagreement.155 Thus, self-contained regimes may more easily rec-
oncile in international law with each other such as EU law and in-
vestment law in that case. Last, maybe the most prominent argument 
which has been claimed by the favors of third-party submissions is it 
will serve more accountability in investor-State arbitration and elimi-
nate public concerns.156 
To the contrary, opponents of third-party submissions argue that 
respondent States can represent the public interest and there is no 
need for NGO’s participation in the proceedings. Moreover, NGO’s 
specific agendas could expand the dispute context.157 For example, in 
“Methanex v. United States of America” case, unlike the U.S. Gov-
ernment arguments about public health concerning undertaken 
measures, NGO’s maintained that environmental issues exist in the 
dispute.158 In my view, probably for that reason, unlike ICSID Rules, 
 151. Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and Tribunals, 
5 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT’L L. 275 (2005).
 152. Tarcisio Gazzini, INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, 345 (2016).
 153. Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implica-
tions of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218
(2011).
 154. Id. at 217.
 155. AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 8.2 (Sep. 23, 2010).
 156. Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Re-
cent Developments, 16(2) REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 239 (2007).
 157. Id. See also, Levine, supra note 153, at 215.
 158. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tri-
bunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶¶ 6-8 (Jan. 15,
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UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency excluded one of the acceptance 
requirements of arbitral tribunals about the third-party submissions 
which require non-disputing parties addressing the issue within the 
context of the dispute.159 Hence, it will be easier to accept amicus cu-
riae submissions for arbitral tribunals. Another counter-argument 
against transparency is that it has a potential risk, through public pro-
ceedings, of disclosing confidential information such as the trade se-
crets of investors.160 There is also a discrete critique which asserts 
that third-party participations may increase the length and process of 
investor-State arbitrations.161 
Consequently, the rising demand for transparency and admit-
tance of “public interest” existence in the litigations affects the new 
rules in international investment arbitration. However, consideration 
of “public interests” always does not guarantee or justify interven-
tions to the investors by the host States. For instance, in the dispute of 
“Santa Elena v. Costa Rica,” the Tribunal explicitly pointed out that 
even if an expropriation of investment has been carrying out for envi-
ronmental reasons, it does not change the legal character of adequate 
compensation.162 According to the Tribunal “public purposes” con-
cerning environmental issues do not affect the duty to pay compensa-
tion for expropriation of investor’s property.163 Kulick commented 
that the majority of the investment tribunals endorsed (global) public 
interest considerations either weakly or strongly. Nevertheless, 
Metalclad, Santa Elena, and Tecmed Tribunals denied holding up en-
vironmental concerns against investor rights.164 Regarding the com-
pensation issue, when we look at the Article 13 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and Article 1110 of the NAFTA, these provisions regulate that 
2001). It had been emphasized in the submissions that there is a need for amicus par-
ticipation for preventing the failure to consider environmental and sustainable devel-
opment goals such as happened in “Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States” 
case which known as very restrictive decision about the regulation power of States. 
Also, it was argued in the submissions that the dispute is concerning the balance be-
tween the implementation of environmental regulations and investor’s property rights. 
 159. See, supra note 149.
 160. Tienhaara, supra note 156, at 240, Levine, supra note 153, at 220.
 161. Id.
 162. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, (2000), ICSID
Rev/FILJ, ¶71 at 192.
 163. Id. ¶72 at 192.
 164. ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 262 (2012).
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requirements of “nationalization or expropriation of an investment” 
and “a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of an 
investment.” Thus, such a measure must be “for a purpose which is in 
the public interest, non-discriminatory, carried out under due process 
of law and accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation.”165 
There is a remarkable critique which defends the common con-
cerns of the international community and asserts that such disputes 
are unsuitable for arbitration because of arbitrators are appointed by 
the disputing parties with private contracts and cannot pretend like 
impartial judges in State courts. Against that critique, some authors 
think that arbitrators are impartial and independent dispute resolvers 
who interpret and apply the law and are subject to various mecha-
nisms that can prevent private interests from taking precedence over 
public interests.166 Schill suggests analyzing investment law with the 
glasses of comparative public law which involves domestic public 
law and other branches of international law as well.167 For instance, 
the author explained that the principle of proportionality, which is de-
rived from national public laws for the purpose of providing a bal-
ance between investor protection and public interests, can accommo-
date non-investment concerns and protect of investors’ rights.168 
4. The Proportionality in International Law
4.1. The Proportionality Analysis and Its Reflections under the
Sub-Branches of International Law 
In international law, proportionality emerges as one of the “gen-
eral principles of law” or as a rule of “customary international law” 
or as a “treaty provision” depending on the context of the regime.169 
In terms of some branches of international law, the “proportionality” 
plays a significant role in settlement of disputes like the “use of 
 165. Article 13 (1) of Energy Charter Treaty and article 1110 (1) of the NAFTA. See also
for explanations; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 835 (2008).
 166. Brower & Schill, supra note 89, at 489. See also, Yen, supra note 124, at 26. Justifi-
ably, the author pointed delaying attempts of respondents regarding the proceedings by
proposing disqualification of an arbitrator. So that, such disqualification proposals do
not always withstand suspicion about the impartiality of the arbitrators.
 167. Schill, supra note 120, at 85.
 168. Id. at 98.
 169. GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION, 67 (2015). 
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force”.170 Higgins also evaluated the proportionality concept under 
the different sub-branches of international law. The author promi-
nently indicated that proportionality plays a vital role especially in 
the maritime delimitation and the use of force. Also added that it is a 
well-accepted principle in the doctrine under the jus in bello concern-
ing its transformation to the specific rules according to the Protocols 
of 1949 Geneva Conventions. Human rights law is another area 
which proportionality has been used as a criterion for restriction of 
freedom, and it has a separate meaning beside necessity (in democrat-
ic societies).171 
Each regime under the international law has its particular as-
sessment method of proportionality. Admittedly, there are standard 
features about this principle, but that does not mean there is a “pro-
portionality test” which is tailored for application to all special re-
gimes in international law. 172 The common features (or requirements) 
of the “proportionality analysis” involves four steps. The first step is 
that the measure which was undertaken by the State must have a 
proper purpose, second that the chosen measure and the purpose must 
have a rational link, and third that the chosen measure must be neces-
sary. It means that there must be no other eligible measure for reach-
ing to the same purpose. The fourth and last step is making a balance 
between public interest and private interest in a strict manner (stricto 
sensu).173 
 170. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715 (2008). (The principle of proportionality does not only
emerge in the armed conflicts but also in the trade or investment disputes and the re-
striction of human rights.). See also, Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993).
 171. Higgins, supra note 139, 236-237. Higgins also indicated her skepticism about the
principle and considered that the status of proportionality as a “general principle of
law” is doubtful. Moreover, the author thought that even though the proportionality
principle has an essential role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries with the equi-
ty principle, it still has full of uncertainties. Id. at 230.
 172. See, Ulf Linderfalk, Towards A More Constructive Analysis of the Identity of Special
Regimes in International Law-The Case of Proportionality, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 874-878 (2013).
 173. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS, 3 (2012). See also, Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 917-
918. Except for the Barak’s book, in the various studies about the proportionality, au-
thors prefer combining two conditions as one condition; so that, their proportionality
analysis involves three steps.
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Neither investment arbitration tribunals174 nor WTO judicial bod-
ies175 rigorously apply “proportionality analysis” devoted to its steps. 
Instead, they utilize this principle pragmatically and more in an un-
complicated manner. However, this pragmatic approach has been 
criticized by various authors. About the issue, Tecmed v. Mexico case 
is very familiar to the international lawyers. The main point of the 
dispute is the rejection of authorization renewal to operate the landfill 
by “National Ecology Institute of Mexico” (INE) which is an agency 
within the Ministry of Environment.176 In that case, the arbitral tribu-
nal points out that the exigency of reasonable relationship in propor-
tionality between the weight imposed on the foreign investor and the 
aim expected from the expropriation measure. The Tribunal quoted 
from ECtHR decisions and indicated that unlike nationals, non-
nationals are more defenseless against the host State’s legislation and 
actions. In this manner, different considerations may apply to non-
nationals in terms of “public interest” concept. Thus, it is possible 
that to bear a greater burden to nationals concerning the “public in-
terest.”177 The Tribunal also considered that political situations aris-
ing from public pressure justified the State’s resolution.178 However, 
it concluded that the respondent State did not present any evidence 
regarding community opposition about consequences of the operation 
of the Landfill on the environment or the public health.179 Moreover, 
the Tribunal reviewed the “fair and equitable treatment” as an 
expression and part of “good faith” (bona fide) principle and, 
considered that “Article 4(1) of the Spain-Mexico BIT” requires the 
“Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment 
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment.”180 Thus, the 
foreign investor expects that the host State to act consistently not ar-
bitrarily. Also, the investor may know beforehand “any rules and 
 174. See, Prabhash Ranjan, Using the Public Law Concept of Proportionality to Balance
Investment Protection with Regulation in International Investment Law: A Critical
Appraisal, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 864 (2014).
 175. Bücheler, supra note 169, at 70.
 176. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 36, 39 (May 29, 2003).
 177. Id. at 122.
 178. Id. at 128.
 179. Id. at 144.
 180. Id. at 153-154.
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regulations as well as the goals of the relevant policies and adminis-
trative practices which will govern its investments.” Therefore, the 
government must not arbitrarily revoke any past decision or permis-
sion which the investor trusted and planned its commercial or busi-
ness activities.181 
The Tribunal’s decision is criticized in the doctrine because it 
bypassed some elements of the proportionality analysis such as ap-
praising the necessity of the measure.182 There is another critique 
about the comprehension of “public interest” by the Tribunal which 
was asserted that it occurred in a local way. As stated in the detailed 
critique by Kulick, despite quoting Santa Elena decision concerning 
the “public interest” existence does not affect the compensation obli-
gation,183 the Tecmed Tribunal constructed its reasoning on the idea 
of “public interest” is an internal concept which serves the interest of 
the national community.184 Thus, according to Kulick, the Tribunal 
concluded that there is a requirement of different treatment to domes-
tic investors rather than the foreign investors with regards to partici-
pating public interest.185 Lastly, maybe the most prominent critique is 
about the appraisements by the Tecmed Tribunal concerning the “fair 
and equitable treatment.” According to Crawford, this is an attempt 
which aiming to rewrite the standard of “fair and equitable treatment” 
through referring to the hypothetical expectations instead of the spe-
cific expectations derived from the facts of each case. Therefore, he 
called that approach as a “utopian standard” which many govern-
ments will fail to meet it.186 In relation to the subject, it may be said 
that the standard of “legitimate expectations” which is a useful guide 
for investment tribunals expanded through that decision. 
The standard of “legitimate expectations” is a part of the general 
principle of “legal certainty” in EU Law and ECHR Law which de-
 181. Id. at 154.
 182. See, Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15
J. INT’L ECON. L. 232-233 (2012). See also, Ranjan, supra note 174, at 865.
 183. See, Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, supra note 176, ¶ 121.
 184. Kulick, supra note 164, at 247, 248.
 185. Id. at 248. (The author defends that the tribunal’s consideration did not coincide with
globalized economy’s facts. Indeed, a company despite it has the foreign nationality,
can have stronger economic relations in another country.).
 186. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 615 (2012).
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rived from domestic laws.187 For the ECtHR, enacting statutes for the 
expropriation of properties mostly have “public interest” including 
the consideration of political, economic and social issues. It seems 
that the Court recognizes a wide margin of appreciation for national 
authorities beforehand. However, it also adds that if legislature’s de-
cision has no reasonable foundation about what is the public interest, 
legitimate expectations of the relevant person may be infringed.188 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has indicated in its various decisions that an 
applicant have a “legitimate expectation” which “must be of nature, 
more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or 
a legal act” according to the proper interpretation and implementation 
of the national law.189 Concerning the matter, the Stretch v. The Unit-
ed Kingdom case has some resemblances with Tecmed case in terms 
of facts and the conclusion.190 As noted by various writers, the stand-
ard of legitimate expectations albeit it has some differences under the 
separate legal regimes such as national laws, ECHR law, and invest-
ment law, it preserves its core elements under each regime.191 
 187. VENICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RULE OF LAW
CHECKLIST 26 (2016). The Venice Commission evaluates the principle of “legal cer-
tainty” under eight sub-headings including the “legitimate expectations.” Indeed, from
the context of international investment law, it is also a fact that the “rule of law,” “in-
dependent and efficient judicial system,” and the “legal certainty” are critical elements
of the favorable investment climate in a country. See, Herdegen, supra note 1, at 354.
 188. See, e.g., James and Others v. The United Kingdom, 98-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32-
33 ¶ 46 (1986); N.K.M. v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 37 (2013).
 189. See, e.g., Béláné Nagy v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75 (2016); Trgo v. Croatia, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 41 (2009); Maurice v. France, 2005-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63; Kopecký v. Slo-
vakia, 2004-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50; Pressos Companía Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, 332
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 ¶ 29 (1995); Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v.
Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 ¶ 51 (1991).
 190. See, Stretch v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 33-35 (2003). The applicant, in
that case, contracted to lease land from Dorchester Council for a term of 22 years. The
lease contract contains an option for renewal for 21 years. Although the applicant gave
notice for exercising that option, West Dorset Council who is the successor of the
Dorchester as a local authority had considered that its predecessor acted ultra vires
while granting the option. Hence, according to the Council, the renewal option was in-
valid. The approach of West Dorset Council was recognized by the English courts
likewise. By contrast that, the ECtHR determined that neither party of the agreement
had been aware of any legal obstacle when they were dealing the option. Therefore,
the Court considered that the applicant had a legitimate expectation for the exercising
of renewal option regarding the purposes of “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
ECHR.”
 191. See, e.g., Rimantas Daujotas & Ramūnas Audzevičius, The Concept of Legitimate Ex-
pectation in Investor-State Arbitration and the European Court of Human Rights, 6
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Similar to Crawford, Schill evaluated that the reasoning of the 
Tecmed Tribunal has a severe weakness concerning the interpretation 
of “fair and equitable treatment.” For the author, interpretation of 
“fair and equitable treatment” in the Tecmed case is acceptable but 
not a necessary one.192 In that vein, some tribunals have followed up 
the path of Tecmed Tribunal. However, the Saluka Tribunal adopted 
more refined approach regarding the interpretation of “fair and equi-
table treatment.”193 The Tribunal indicated that the expectations of 
foreign investors include fundamental standards such as “good faith,” 
“due process,” and “non-discrimination.”194 However, it observed that 
if these terms are taken too literally, “host States’ obligations would 
be inappropriate and unrealistic.” The “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard cannot solely be specified by foreign investors’ subjective 
considerations.195 No investor may rationally expect that the condi-
tions at the time of making the investment maintain without altera-
tion. For determination of whether there is an infringement of inves-
Вестник Международного Коммерческого Арбитража (Bulletin of the Internation-
al Commercial Arbitration), 12 (2012) Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2197157; Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in In-
vestment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Con-
cept, 28 ICSID Rev/FILJ, 121 (2013). Compare, ROLAND KLAGER, ‘FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 164, 
187 (2011). Klager points out that investment tribunals have not established yet com-
prehensive criteria relating the conflict between investors’ legitimate expectations and 
host States’ public interests. Trevor Zeyl, Charting the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of 
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law, 49 ALBERTA L. REV. 226, 234-
235 (2011). Zeyl acknowledges the core elements of the “legitimate expectations” are 
same in the each one of legal regimes. However, he criticizes the way of implementa-
tion of that standard because of against it there are various restrictive doctrines in the 
domestic laws such as ultra vires principle and separation of powers doctrine, alt-
hough, investment tribunals have not applied such restriction. Cf. Sornarajah, supra 
note 62, at 354-355. Sornarajah opposes the view that the standard of “legitimate ex-
pectations” is derived from domestic laws and it can be acknowledged as a “general 
principle of law.” According to him, that standard has rarely been used as a substantive 
principle because of the practical difficulties during the proceedings. Therefore, Sor-
narajah asserts that “legitimate expectations” only provide procedural protection un-
der the English law, so that, it has been used as a substantive rule by ICSID tribunals 
for justifying their Awards concerning the damages caused by the breach of BITs. 
 192. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 335 (2009).
 193. Id. at 337.
 194. Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 303
(Mar. 17, 2006).
 195. Id. ¶ 304.
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tors’ legitimate and reasonable expectations, public interest consider-
ations also must be taken into account by the tribunals concerning the 
host States’ regulation process.196 Thus, the Saluka Tribunal empha-
sized the importance of proportionality between “investors’ expecta-
tions” and “public interest considerations” of States. Parallel to the 
inference of “investment conditions would not maintain without 
change,” the Duke v. Ecuador,197 Bayindir v. Pakistan,198 and Occi-
dental v. Ecuador199 Tribunals prominently noted investors must take 
into account all circumstances of the host State.200 
Unlike the Tecmed Tribunal, in the dispute of Occidental v. Ec-
uador, the Tribunal evaluated the “necessity of the measure” in the 
proportionality test. However, it has also mentioned and has been 
influenced by the Tecmed Award in its judgment.201 The Tribunal re-
viewed that whether the Ecuador administration has any other option 
except Caducidad (Expiration) Decree or not. Then the Tribunal con-
sidered that there are some options could be made by Ecuador; there-
fore, it found that respondent’s argument is invalid.202 The same issue 
was discussed in the annulment proceeding also. Ecuador claimed 
that the principle of proportionality has not been included by the Par-
 196. Id. ¶ 305.
 197. According to the tribunal “the assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must
take into account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the in-
vestment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions pre-
vailing in the host State.” Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Re-
public of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008). The
tribunal also bore in mind that the duty to meet the “legitimate expectations” of the in-
vestor and population of the State through establishing certainty in the “rule of law.” It
is understood from that explanation, so as the Tribunal took into consideration of the
reality that standard of “legitimate expectations” is a part of “legal certainty” under the
“rule of law.” Id, ¶ 117.
 198. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29 Award, ¶179 (Aug. 27, 2009). In that dispute, the tribunal re-
viewed the expectations of investors, in-depth relating whether recognized as legiti-
mate or not. In this context, the tribunal determined the claimant was aware fragility of
the political conditions in Pakistan. The claimant also admitted that it was aware of the
potential adverse effect of a change in government. Therefore, the tribunal did not ac-
cept the allegation of investor’s legitimate expectations be frustrated. Id. ¶¶ 193-199.
 199. Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Com-
pany v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶383 (Oct. 5,
2012). The Tribunal denied the claimants’ assertation regarding the Caducidad Decree
frustrated their legitimate expectations.
 200. Potestà, supra note 191, at 118-119.
 201. Occidental v. Ecuador, supra note 199, ¶¶ 406-409.
 202. Id. ¶¶ 428-436.
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ticipation Contract, Ecuadorian law, or in customary international 
law. But the ad hoc Committee did not agree with this argument 
about the existence of the “error of laws.”203 Unlike, it shared the 
same idea about the Tribunal’s findings that the Ecuadorian law and 
international law contained the principle of proportionality as a gen-
eral principle of punitive and tort law.204 
When switching the scope of review from investment case law to 
WTO jurisprudence, coming across sophisticated issues is inevitable. 
Andenas and Zleptnig pointed out that balancing interests through 
WTO Agreements is a complicated process and requires comparative 
research about the proportionality.205 The complexity is originated 
from the critical mission which is aiming to accomplish the balance 
between trade interests and non-trade interests.206 The Korea-Beef 
case is an excellent example for reviewing WTO jurisprudence about 
the proportionality. In that dispute, Korea implemented a quota, dual 
retail system, and other measures related to importation beef products 
then defended all of the measures by saying that they were consistent 
with GATT 1994.207 The panel applied proportionality analysis re-
garding the dual retail system. However, as mentioned above,208 it did 
not pursue the steps of the proportionality analysis. Directly, the pan-
el examined the dual retail system and concluded that this implemen-
tation was beyond the goals of Korean Unfair Competition Act. 
Therefore, it decided that dual retail system regarding the importation 
of beef products is disproportionate measure and it could not be 
justified by “Article XX(d) of GATT.”209 In the Appellate Body 
phase of the proceedings, Korea claimed that the panel erred in the 
applying Article XX(d) of GATT. According to the Korean govern-
ment’s consideration, there is no alternative measure would provide 
 203. Occidental v. Ecuador, Decision on Annulment of the Award, ¶ 349 (Nov. 2, 2015).
However, the Committee partially annulled the Award because of the error in the ra-
tione personae jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned transference of %40 shares by
claimant into a new investor. See, Id. ¶¶ 257-272.
 204. Id. ¶ 350.
 205. Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law: in Comparative Per-
spective, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 374 (2007).
 206. Id. at 377.
 207. Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R WT/DS169/R (adopted Jul. 31, 2000) ¶¶ 62, 146-150. (here-
inafter Korea-Beef Panel Report).
 208. See, supra at 30-31.
 209. Korea-Beef Panel Report, ¶¶ 496, 675-676.
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the same conclusion about combating fraud in the market of beef 
products except the dual retail system.210 Nevertheless, the Appellate 
Body did not accept that claim.211 Thus, the panel’s decision which 
accepting the dual retail system as a disproportionate measure ap-
proved by the Appellate Body. 
4.2. Use of Force and The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality has a different meaning in the 
use of force compared to other sub-branches of international law in 
terms of limitation harming others.212 Hence, in jus ad bellum, pro-
portionality is not a decisive factor in some situations concerning 
which States can legitimately resort to force. Instead, it observes the 
way of use of force which is applied.213 
Proportionality has become a more important principle in the law 
of the sea related to the use of force. Recent cases in that field have 
proved this reality. The arbitration practice under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS and ITLOS cases have some examples. The “M/V Saiga 
(No. 2)” case which is the first dispute submitted to the ITLOS con-
tains excessive use of force allegation. The ITLOS explicitly stated in 
the judgment that coastal authorities must avoid excessive use of 
force which is beyond the reasonable and necessary circumstances.214 
Afterward, the Tribunal decided that when respondent State’s (Guin-
ean) officers used their guns, they did not act carefully about the safe-
ty of the ship and the human life on board due to the two persons’ in-
juries and significant damages on board. Thus, the Tribunal found 
that Guinea violated flag State’s (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) 
rights under the international law.215 By such decisions, arise a view 
that the “considerations of humanity” increasingly has been displayed 
in the proportionality test regarding jus ad bellum conflicts.216 The 
“Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988” has specific 
provisions concerning that matter. Article 8bis (9) rules that “under 
 210. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R WT/DS169/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000) ¶ 175.
 211. Id. ¶ 180.
 212. Higgins, supra note 139, 230.
 213. Judith Gardam, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES, 20 (2003).
 214. See, supra note 109.
 215. Id. 158-159.
 216. See, Gardam, supra note 213, at 209.
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this article, the use of force must be avoided except when necessary 
to ensure the safety of officials and persons on board. Any use of 
force according to this article must not exceed the minimum degree 
of force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.” 
Outside the context of that provision, the “law of the sea” tribunals 
have determined that boarding to a vessel and then using excessive 
force against persons on board would violate international law.217 
Arbitral tribunals which are constituted under the Annex VII of 
UNCLOS has continued the ITLOS’ approach in their cases. For in-
stance, Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case dis-
cussed the principles of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionali-
ty. The claimant (Netherlands) in that case argued that respondent’s 
(Russia) actions about suppression to protests in the sea must be rea-
sonable and when they used force, it is essential to obey customary 
law principles of necessity and proportionality.218 Annex VII Tribunal 
accepted that for the protection of their sovereign rights, coastal 
States might undertake appropriate measures pursuant to their legiti-
mate aim. Also, the Tribunal indicated that such measures must fulfill 
the requirements of the principles of reasonableness, necessity, and 
proportionality.219 However, the Tribunal identified some breaches 
under the UNCLOS regarding unlawful boarding, seizure, and deten-
tion of the vessel; so that, it concluded that there is no need to con-
sider the reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality of relevant 
measures undertaken by respondent.220 
 217. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS, 231 (2014).
 218. The “Arctic Sunrise Arbitration” (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on the Merits, 52, ¶
221 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) It must be mentioned one of the features of that argument.
The Netherlands have evaluated the proportionality as a part of the customary law, un-
like Ecuador. However, in the Occidental v. Ecuador case, Ecuador asserted that cus-
tomary law does not involve the principle of proportionality. See, supra note 203. That
difference between two arguments could be explained merely by the content of the
cases which belong to different special regimes under the international law. The nature
of a dispute can be able to alter the normative position of proportionality. If the pro-
portionality principle is evaluated by an international judicial body in the context of
the “use of force,” it must be considered as a part of the customary law by virtue of the
ICJ’s jurisprudence. On the other hand, I think that the proportionality principle is ac-
ceptable as one of the “general principles of law” in other special regimes of interna-
tional law such as the investment law, WTO law, and the delimitation of maritime
boundaries, under the Article 38/1(c) of the ICJ Statute.
 219. Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, The Merits, 82, ¶ 326.
 220. Id. 83, ¶ 333.
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More recently another dispute gives plenty of clues from the 
standpoint of the “law of the sea” tribunals related the principle of 
proportionality. The Annex VII Tribunal of the Duzgit Integrity case 
reviewed the proportionality dispute between parties. First of all, the 
Tribunal determined that Article 293 of UNCLOS permits to the 
courts and tribunals for utilizing relevant general international law 
rules and principles which not incompatible with UNCLOS. Notably, 
it emphasized that the principle of reasonableness and its elements 
which are principles of necessity and proportionality not only appli-
cable in use of force cases but also covers law enforcement 
measures.221 The substance of the concerned dispute was “ship to ship 
transfer” and the disagreement between parties was originated from 
alleged charges of smuggling concluded with the detention of vessel, 
fines, and indemnification. The Tribunal considered that custom fines 
imposed by the respondent (São Tomé) which amount more than a 
one-million-euro were disproportionate. Moreover, it decided that the 
detention of the vessel and the master, monetary sanctions, and con-
fiscation of entire cargo was excessive compared to the alleged of-
fenses.222 
Abundant decisions rendered by various international judicial 
bodies utilize the doctrine of proportionality as a general principle of 
international law; nonetheless, the principle had preserved its vague-
ness as a legal norm until recently.223 However, it has achieved its le-
gitimacy because of its frequent practice and has mostly wriggled out 
its ambiguousness.224 
4.3. The Principle of Proportionality as a Legal Balancing Tool 
Between the Investors’ Rights and the Host States’ Public Interests 
International investment agreements do not contain a proportion-
ality analysis; nevertheless, investment tribunals review the cases 
which they encountered regarding whether the disputes met the re-
quirements of the proportionality principle.225 However, almost none 
 221. The Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), Award, 54-55, ¶¶
208-210 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
 222. Id. 69-71, ¶¶ 254-262.
 223. Franck, supra note 170, at 716.
 224. Id. at 718.
 225. See, e.g., Bücheler, supra note 169, at 132; N. Jansen Calamita, The Principle of Pro-
portionality and the Problem of Indeterminacy in International Investment Treaties, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2013-2014,
372 (Andrea K. Bjorklund, ed., 2015).
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of the awards rendered by the arbitral tribunals explicitly resort to the 
proportionality either as a “general principle of law” or a rule of “cus-
tomary international law.”226 Nonetheless, in my opinion, the expand-
ing impact of “public interest” concept in the investor-State arbitra-
tion, urges arbitral tribunals to resort the proportionality as a “general 
principle of law.” Although some doubts have been asserted by the 
various authors regarding the admittance of proportionality as a 
general principle of law, such approach can change depending on the 
acceptance of different views in the debate regarding roots of “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” under the 
“Article 38(1)(c) of Statute of the ICJ.”227 
There are three views about the meaning of “Article 38(1)(c) of 
Statute of ICJ/PCIJ.” The first view, which is expressed by various 
authors such as Anzilotti, Castberg and, Morelli, claims that that pro-
vision primarily refers to the “general principles of international law” 
and only in case of secondary situations it admits to obtaining from 
domestic law principles of different States.228 The second view, 
which is supported by Strupp and Scerni, argues that Article 38(1)(c) 
can only refer to obtaining from domestic law principles.229 The third 
view asserted by Lauterpacht claims that “the general principles of 
law” are, in reality, recognized principles of private law, which are 
applied both by the international tribunals and the States.230 
 226. Calamita, supra note 225, at 168.
 227. Id. footnote 56. The author indicated the lack of acceptance of the proportionality
principle as a “general principle of law” in domestic laws outside of Europe and North
America, and he gave the example of China which does not recognize proportionality
in its constitutional & administrative law. However, a Chinese author expressed that
although the absence of proportionality principle in Chinese administrative law and its
Constitution, that principle can be found in Chinese traditional culture as a reflection
of moderation. Han Xiuli, On the Application of the Principle of Proportionality in
ICSID Arbitration and Proposals to Government of the People’s Republic of China, 13
James Cook U. L. Rev. 254 (2006). Moreover, Xiuli suggested to the Chinese govern-
ment be more careful against BIT clauses regarding ICSID jurisdiction for reducing
the probability of implementation of the proportionality principle. He also recom-
mended to the government for the pursuance of legitimate objectives against foreign
investors and application of regulatory investment measures according to the propor-
tionality principle. Xiuli, at 257. For a suspicious view about the implementation of
proportionality as a general principle of law, see also, Higgins, supra note 139, at 230.
 228. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 2 (1987).
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In case of the acceptance of second or third view, the proportion-
ality principle cannot be utilized under the “Article 38(1)(c) of ICJ 
Statute.” Because as mentioned above, the proportionality test neither 
exists in all civilized nations’ laws nor is admitted as a principle of 
private law. However, if the first view is upheld, the proportionality 
would be recognized as a “general principle of international law” es-
pecially in the event of an absence of a treaty provision. I think this 
approach compatible with the draft history of the “Article 38(1)(c) of 
ICJ/PCIJ Statute.” The Advisory Committee of PCIJ Statute bore in 
mind while writing the provision that if the international law allows 
applying only treaties and custom, it may force international judges 
to commit “denial of justice” by declaring non-liquet.231 
The arrangement of balance between investors’ rights and public 
interest of States in expropriation provisions of investment agree-
ments diverges from ECHR and national constitutions.232 Therefore, 
that fact would not preclude the international arbitrators to construct 
their proportionality concept in investment matters which have a dif-
ferent character than other legal regimes such as ECHR and national 
constitutions. It does not mean that international investment arbitra-
tors produced, an entirely new general principle of law. Instead, they 
can incorporate a “general principle of law” from other legal systems 
and apply the same principle in a different manner for providing 
harmonization this concept with investment law.233 
4.4. The Proportionality Analysis in Economic Exigency Situa-
tions 
One of the arguments regarding the interpretation of “Article 25 
of the ILC Draft 2001” is this provision implicitly involves “least-
restrictive-means test,” or “proportionality analysis.”  Thus, that pro-
vision may be able to justify a wrongful act, if the relevant action is 
the “only way” for the protection of the State’s vital interest. For this 
reason, in economic exigency disputes before the investment tribu-
nals, it is suggested the incorporation of the “proportionality analy-
 231. Cheng, supra note 228, at 18.
 232. BÜCHELER, supra note 169, at 135. The author also indicated that standard BIT provi-
sions on expropriation had improved the investment protection compared to customary
international law implications such as Calvo doctrine and principle of national treat-
ment. Thus, contemporary investment treaties have proved that the foreign investors
do not have to accept policy changes of the host States without compensation.
 233. Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 913.
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sis.”234 Another argument asserted by Bücheler is that the proportion-
ality test cannot replace the “only way” test in Article 25. Bücheler 
relies on the draft process of Article 25 in his argument because 
travaux préparatoires shows that the necessity defense in customary 
law usually comes into question in the disputes which contain the use 
of force.235 
Apart from that reason, the most important one is acknowledging 
the “only way” requirement in Article 25 as a threshold which is 
higher than the proportionality test. As a codified rule of customary 
law, Article 25 intends to preclude States from their international ob-
ligations through necessity defense.236 Lastly, Bücheler suggests that 
if States aim to provide a balance between the public interest and in-
vestors’ rights, it is the best way for them to carry out the incorpora-
tion of the NPM provisions in BITs.237 Otherwise, Article 25 would 
become a “super-NPM clause” and begin to undermine BITs’ provi-
sions in practice.238 Similarly, Sweet endorses the idea of utilizing the 
proportionality test in the disputes related economic crisis such as the 
Argentine cases.239 Beyond that, his inferences are remarkable about 
the topic. Sweet draws attention to the possibility that the CMS, En-
ron, and Sempra Tribunals arguably bore in mind that their task is 
based on the protection of the investments. Besides, he indicates that 
the members of the tribunals might be hesitate to apply the propor-
tionality analysis to refrain from acting like “balancing judge” rather 
 234. See generally Bjorklund, supra note 40, at 487. See also August Reinisch, Necessity
in International Investment Arbitration-An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent
ICSID Cases? 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE, 200-01 (2007). Reinisch especial-
ly criticizes the LG&E decision because of the arbitral tribunal did not implement the
proportionality test regarding whether Argentine’s economic recovery package was
acceptable as the “only way” to cope with financial crisis. See LG&E v. Argentine,
supra note 20, at ¶ 257. Furthermore, he justifiably points out the risk of accepting the
disproportionate solutions as “only way” for the struggle with a crisis. But cf. Alvarez
& Khamsi, supra note 24, at 447. The authors assert that neither “Article XI” nor the
whole “U.S.- Argentine BIT” contains consideration of the proportionality for a bal-
ance between regulatory powers of states and the rights of foreign investors.
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than “conventional arbitrators.”240 Consequently, after annulment de-
cisions concerning those Tribunals’ Awards, it can be estimated that 
unlike traditional “state of necessity” cases in public international 
law, investment tribunals will begin to adopt the proportionality anal-
ysis in treaty-based arbitrations. 
Conclusion 
In international law, some concerns regarding human rights or 
preservation of the environment relevant to the international commu-
nity or public of the States have become more and more influential. 
Therefore, eminent scholars and arbitral tribunals have taken differ-
ent positions in various cases. In the history of international law, 
from very first case to nowadays, respondent States have been tried to 
justify their internationally wrongful acts by an assertion that they 
committed such actions for the protection of their essential interests. 
For that reason, international courts and tribunals have scrutinized 
necessity defenses of respondent States in many cases. Except for a 
few cases, international judicial bodies mostly have rejected the ne-
cessity defenses because of its strict requirements under the custom-
ary law which had been codified in the “Article 25 of the ILC Draft 
2001.” 
The necessity defense has a higher threshold than the public in-
terest defense for its acceptance. It is understandable because the 
“state of necessity” is a condition which precludes the wrongfulness 
of an action made by respondent State; nevertheless, “public interest” 
is a classical argument of States in cases of expropriation of alien in-
vestors’ properties and that argument is especially meaningful in in-
direct expropriations. In the last years, the “public interest” argument 
came to the forefront under its different appearances in the invest-
ment arbitrations. Besides the preservation of interests of the interna-
tional community in related disputes which have environmental or 
human rights matters, protecting host States’ population through the 
regulations of the governments has come into question commonly be-
fore the investment tribunals. Another dimension of the “public inter-
est” concept is also remarkable. Accordingly, it has a key role in the 
 240. Id. at 75. See also Cynthia C. Galvez, “Necessity,” Investor Rights, and State Sover-
eignty for NAFTA Investment Arbitration, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 143, 151-52 (2013).
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transparency endeavor of the proceedings. It also constitutes a basis 
for the third-party submissions which is known as amicus curiae. 
From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, non-
economic factors must be excluded from the proceedings of the in-
vestment disputes unless there is an existence of the explicit provi-
sion in a treaty or an agreement. Accordingly, this approach prioritiz-
es the protection of investments and leave the environmental or 
humanitarian consideration aside; it also does not support the doc-
trine of “margin of appreciation.” However, in the considerable num-
ber of tribunal decisions, environmental or human rights matters have 
been taken into consideration. Furthermore, numerous scholars have 
not embraced the idea of the exclusion of non-investment factors in 
the investor-State arbitrations. 
Deference of the regulation power of governments has substan-
tial importance in decision-making, but adoption of the doctrine of 
“margin of appreciation” to the investment disputes, features some 
risks. The main risk concerning the adoption of that doctrine is it may 
cause unbalance between the weight of the public interest of host 
States and foreign investors’ rights, along with their legitimate expec-
tations. At this stage, the importance of the proportionality principle 
in investment disputes must be remembered. In the different areas of 
international law, the proportionality can play its role in the disa-
greements as a treaty provision, exercise of “customary international 
law” or a “general principle of law.” Throughout international law, 
proportionality can play its role in disagreement in a treaty provision, 
exercise of “customary international law” or a “general principle of 
law.” Thus, such a tribunal would find a balance between investor’s 
rights and a host State’s interests, as well as it may preserve the legit-
imacy of the investor-State arbitration system through stabilizing 
each parties’ benefits. 
At last, it must be underlined that regarding the relationship be-
tween the “state of necessity” and the “principle of proportionality” 
which the “state of necessity” does not require a proportionality anal-
ysis. Customary international law proves that fact. However, “NPM 
clauses” in the BITs requires the proportionality analysis for the equi-
librium between vital interests of the States and protection of the for-
eign investments. Therefore, in several cases, ad hoc annulment 
committees draw attention to the separability of necessity require-
ments and the NPM provisions in the BITs. Thus, the committees an-
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nulled the awards since the tribunals did not review the applicability 
of “state of necessity” under the “customary international law” and 
the “NPM clauses” in the BITs separately. 
